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ABSTRACT
Myths on the Move: A Critical Pluralist Approach to the Study of Classical
Mythology in Post-Classical Works
David Carter Delbar
Department of Comparative Arts and Letters, BYU
Master of Arts
The Classical Tradition, now more commonly known as Classical Reception, is a
growing sub-discipline in Classics which seeks to trace the influence of Greco-Roman culture in
post-classical works. While scholars have already done much to analyze specific texts, and many
of these analyses are theoretically complex, there has yet to be a review of the theories these
scholars employ. The purpose of this study is to provide researchers with a theoretical tool kit
which allows them greater scope and nuance when analyzing usages of classical mythology. It
examines five different approaches scholars have used: adaptation, allusion, intertextuality,
reception, and typology. Each theory is followed by an example from Spanish literature or film:
Apollo and Daphne in Calderón’s El laurel de Apolo, Orpheus in Unamuno’s Niebla, Dionysus
in Unamuno’s San Manuel Bueno, mártir, Persephone in del Torro’s El laberinto del fauno, and
the werewolf in Naschy’s Waldemar Daninsky films. This thesis argues that a critical pluralist
approach best captures the nuance and variety of usages of classical mythology. This allows for
both objective and subjective readings of texts as well as explicit and implicit connections to
classical mythology.

Keywords: classical tradition, reception, adaptation, allusion, intertextuality, typology, Pedro
Calderón de la Barca, Miguel de Unamuno, Guillermo del Toro, Paul Naschy, Friedrich
Nietzsche, Euripides, Publius Ovidius Naso, El laurel de Apolo, Niebla, San Manuel Bueno
mártir, Bacchae, Apollo, Cupid, Dionysus, Orpheus, Persephone, werewolf
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Introduction
Classical myths are ubiquitous. They have seeped into films, television shows, music,
advertising, video games, and nearly all other forms of media, and have long since formed the
backbone of canonical western literature. Classical scholars are becoming increasingly interested
in these proliferations of classical mythology in post-classical works, recognizing that its usage is
a natural extension of the discipline of classical studies. Gilbert Highet’s The Classical Tradition
(1964) inaugurated the eponymous sub-discipline while Charles Martindale’s Redeeming the
Text (1993) revitalized the field and introduced Hans Robert Jauss’ reception theory to allow for
multiple, reader-oriented interpretations of both ancient texts and their successors. His efforts
ultimately redubbed the field as Reception Studies, which continues to grow to this day.
Most of the scholarship so far has focused on criticism of individual works, explaining
how an understanding of classical myth and its “usage” 1 in a post-classical text can enrich a
reader’s understanding. Less work has been done to elucidate the overarching theories and
underlying methodologies of the field. In 2008, James Porter wrote, “while so much of the new
scholarship in reception is theoretically sophisticated, . . . to date no theory tailored to the
specific exigencies of Greek and Roman reception exists.”2 Thus far the explanations of its
methods are fragmented and scattered through many essays and books. This thesis attempts to
gather and expand upon the various theories classical scholars have written which concern
analyzing usages of classical myth. The goal is to produce a theoretical tool-kit for analyzing the
uses of classical mythology in modern media. Rather than restricting the study to one method, I

It has become common parlance in classics to call all examples of classical references in post-classical texts
“receptions.” However, reception is a specific theory which I address in chapter 4. In order not to confuse this with
other theories, I call classical references “usages” as a neutral term.
2
James Porter, “Reception Studies: Future Prospects,” in A Companion to Classical Receptions, eds. Lorna
Hardwick and Christopher Stray (Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 474.
1

1

will examine several different theoretical approaches. This allows scholars the freedom to
analyze nearly anything by applying different methodological tools.
A central question still in debate is what counts as a usage of classical mythology.
Considering the pervasive nature of the classics in Western civilization, how might one
distinguish between the classical and the non-classical elements of a text? While some usages are
explicit, others are implied or suggest a connection with the mythic past that is ultimately
unprovable. Rather than thinking of the influences on works in a binary sense (classical/nonclassical), it is better to visualize uses of classical myth as falling on a spectrum between the two
extremes of “objective” adaptations and “subjective” archetypal groupings. Using this model,
nearly all texts can be analyzed through the lens of classical mythology, and scholars can choose
which analytical method best suits the text they are studying.
To this end I have organized the paper into five different categories of usages of classical
myth. They are by no means discrete and represent different lenses through which to analyze
texts rather than a strict taxonomy. One could formulate more or fewer categories, and this essay
is only meant to organize the past conversation on the theories of classical usages and continue it
in the hopes of sparking more theoretical development in the future.
The first category is adaptation; following the work of Linda Hutcheon and Gerard
Genette, a usage of classical myth is acknowledged, sustained, and transformed within a modern
work. The second category is allusion, which describes a series of named, brief usages to an
ancient myth which color the meaning of the work without becoming central. The third category
is intertextuality, which assumes classical myths have influenced all subsequent Western
literature, even when the author may not be aware of it. The fourth category is reception, the
most commonly known in classics due to Martindale’s work. It assumes that meaning is created
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by the reader, which allows a scholar to either reconstruct an author’s reading of a myth or to use
a myth as a means of interpreting a modern text even when a myth is not explicitly evoked. The
final category is a form of typology based on Iser’s reader-response theory, which assumes that
readers have already created a relatively stable pattern of a myth in their mind, which in turn
influences how they interpret yet-to-be-encountered usages of the myth. Each chapter concludes
with a brief example from Spanish literature demonstrating the theory of analyzing its classical,
mythic contents.
Throughout this thesis I consistently explain analytical methods in textual terms such as
author, reader, and text. However, many of these ideas can be adapted to other media such as
film, art, theater, etc. and some of my examples are drawn from non-literary media. While I will
not go into detail of how literature and other media differ in usages of classical mythology, I
would hope that scholars will nonetheless find these techniques useful beyond the logocentric
terms found here.
Scholars originally developed the theories and analytical techniques which I have
gathered into this thesis to explain general phenomena in literature and other media, but I have
limited their application to classical mythology. They have been applied to literature outside of
Classics, and they could be applied to other classical material that is not strictly mythological.
Yet again, for simplicity’s sake, I will limit my examples to classical myth and refer only to how
these theories might explain their movement into post-classical works.
I hope that other scholars in Reception Studies and the Classical Tradition will find the
questions, problems, and the proposed answers useful in their continued exploration of the rich
afterlife of classical mythology.

3

Chapter 1: Adaptation
Mythic adaptations reinterpret an explicit classical precursor and rely on the reader’s
knowledge of the base text to showcase the author’s innovation. According to Julie Sanders,
adaptations “openly declare themselves as an interpretation or re-reading of a canonical
precursor” 3 while Linda Hutcheon defines them as “deliberate, announced, and extended
revisitations of prior works.” 4 The author’s overt insistence that the reader make a sustained
comparison between a new and a classical text distinguishes adaptations from other mythic
usages. Thus the new text’s relation to its classical predecessor becomes primary to its
interpretation rather than ancillary.
Because adaptations are “openly declared” and “announced,” they are the most objective
uses of classical myth, which is one of the great strengths of using the adaptive model for
analysis. However, this need for objectivity makes the application of the adaptive model among
the most limited in scope; a scholar must be able to show that the author intentionally employed
a classical myth as the basis for the new adaptation. Many works that still draw on classical myth
but do not do so explicitly are therefore excluded from the adaptive model.
The first half of this chapter focuses on answering the question of what “counts” as an
adaptation: what proof is needed, where such proof can be found, and how to identify which
version of a classical myth should be the basis of comparison. The second half is a close reading
of an adaptation where the base text is obvious (Calderón’s El laurel de Apolo, which adapts the
Daphne and Apollo narrative from Ovid’s Metamorphoses). Because this text does not require
extensive proofs concerning the source myth, the example analysis focuses on how adaptation
creates meaning through tension between the classical base text and the new reworked text.
Julie Sanders, Adaptation and Appropriation, 2nd edition (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 3.
Linda Hutcheon with Siobhan O’Flynn, A Theory of Adaptation, 2nd edition (London and New York: Routledge,
2013), xvi. See also page 8.
3
4
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Though the other brief examples in this chapter are specific, the principles should be broadly
applicable to the study of classical adaptations.

Identifying Adaptations

The palimpsest is an especially useful metaphor for understanding how adaptations
operate. 5 The new work is a hypertext which the author writes over a classical hypotext. The
reader simultaneously reads the new hypertext while he recalls the previously-read hypotext,
which sometimes overlaps with the hypertext as a perfect match and at other times blurs the
meaning into something unrecognizable. This double reading creates a palimpsestuous feel and
is the central literary technique for adaptations. As Hutcheon posits, the palimpsest grants a
“pleasure [which] . . . comes simply from repetition with variation, from the comfort of ritual
combined with the piquancy of surprise.” 6
For this effect to function, however, the reader must know that the text is an adaptation of
an earlier hypotext, and the author must somehow acknowledge which text the reader should
know beforehand to gain the most pleasure from the hypertext. Hutcheon explains:
If we do not know that what we are experiencing actually is an adaptation or if we are not
familiar with the particular work that it adapts, we simply experience the adaptation as
we would any other work. To experience it as an adaptation, however, as we have seen,
we need to recognize it as such and to know its adapted text, thus allowing the latter to
oscillate in our memories with what we are experiencing. 7

Michael Alexander first coined the metaphor of adaptations as palimpsests; Gérard Genette and Hutcheon later
developed the concept further.
6
Hutcheon, A Theory of Adaptation, 4.
7
Hutcheon, A Theory of Adaptation, 120.
5
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A key aspect of adaptations is therefore how the author chooses to communicate the presence of
a hypotext.
An author can signal that his text is an adaptation in multiple ways. Perhaps the most
common is by means of the paratext, which Genette describes as
generally less explicit and more distant relationship that binds the text properly speaking,
taken within the totality of the literary work . . . a title, a subtitle, intertitles, prefaces,
postfaces, notices, forewords, etc.; marginal, infrapaginal, terminal notes; epigraphs;
illustrations; blurbs, book covers; dust jackets, and many other kinds of secondary
signals, whether allographic or autographic. 8
The title of a hypertextual art-piece may contain a reference to a classical myth, the synopsis on
the book cover could make the connection explicit, and the opening or closing credits of a film
will often indicate if a work is “based on” an earlier hypotext. The author may also declare his
intentions in a foreword or introduction. In all these cases the author desires the reader to
consider the work as a hypertext in connection with a specific hypotext and therefore ensures the
connection is explicit. Because the palimpsestuous reading benefits from clarity, it is to the
author’s advantage for the reader to keep the hypotext in mind from the beginning of the reading
process to the end.
Another way to signal an adaptation is to reference the myth within the main text.
Characters might bear the same or similar names as classical counterparts or a character could
recount or recall the classical myth. If these signals are given early in the text, they serve a
similar purpose of inviting the reader to consider the palimpsestuous nature of the text from the
beginning. If, on the other hand, they are not revealed until later in the text, it may give the
Gérard Genette, Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree, trans. Channa Newman and Claude Doubinsky
(Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 3.

8

6

reader a surprise as the already-read portions of the text suddenly snap into focus as a hypertext
while foreshadowing the traditional ending of the hypotext.
There are times when a new work does not declare a mythic hypotext, yet the narrative or
themes are so close to a recognizable classical myth that the connection seems unavoidable.
These are what Gregory Daughetry calls “masked” adaptations, hypertexts which rely on a
mythic hypotext but whose authors have deliberately concealed their source. 9 Their motivations
for doing so are varied; authors may wish to appear more original to uninformed readers or
believe that their work may have a wider appeal if readers do not perceive their work as an
“elitist” classical adaptation. Whatever the author’s reasons, once the reader uncovers the
classical hypotext, the work functions much like other adaptations, comparing and contrasting
the familiar and innovative.
Verification of an adapted mythic hypotext, however, presents difficulties when the
author seeks to conceal it. Adaptations rely on intentional uses of myth; therefore a scholar must
prove authorial intent. Sometimes an author will forego acknowledgement of the hypotext in the
hypertext itself but will acknowledge it in other locations. This may be to create two ways of
reading a text: as an uninformed reader who enjoys the hypertext as an independent work, or as
an informed reader who enjoys the palimpsestuous reading. If the author is indeed inviting
scholars to make an informed, adaptive reading, the scholar must look outside the hypertext itself
for proof of this invitation.
Proof of adaptive intent is most often found in what Genette called epitexts, “any
paratextual element not materially appended to the text within the same volume but circulating,

Gregory Daugherty, “Sullivan’s Travels (1941): Re-imagining Homer’s Odyssey on Screen,” guest lecture at
Brigham Young University, 15 March 2017.
9
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as it were, freely, in a virtually limitless physical and social space.” 10 The scholar places the
author under surveillance for any indication that he intended his text to be read with a mythic
hypotext. Possible sources include anywhere the author has spoken about his work:
newspapers and magazines, radio or television programs, lectures and colloquia, all
public performances perhaps preserved on recordings or printed collections: interviews
and conversations assembled by the author . . . or by the intermediary . . . proceedings of
colloquia, collections of autocommentary . . . Anywhere outside the book may also be the
statements contained in an author’s correspondence or journal. 11
Once a scholar determines which mythic hypotext the author uses, she can proceed with
analyzing the adaptation and her research becomes a transmitter of the informed reading.
James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922) is a good example of a partially masked adaptation. The
title is an open acknowledgement that the text is an adaptation of Homer’s Odyssey; Joyce is
inviting the reader to compare the two texts. However, the chapter titles, which Joyce did not
include in his final draft, contain additional references to specific parts of the Odyssey, which
guide an informed reader’s interpretation of the text. Stephen Dedalus’ musings in the first
chapter take on the new meanings of youthful, unmentored restlessness and malcontent when the
chapter is entitled “Telemachus.” The disjointed beginning of chapter eleven, the intermittent
honking of Boylan’s car horn, and the tapping of the blind piano tuner’s cane create an
underlying musical rhythm, an appropriate theme for a chapter entitled “Sirens.” Here Leopold
Bloom desires to escape momentarily the pain of his wife’s affair through the nostalgic Irish
music of bar and hotel, just as Odysseus finds temporary respite in the Siren’s knowledge of his

Gérard Genette, Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997), 344.
11
Ibid., 344–45.
10
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past exploits.12 The mythological reference brings music, with all its soothing dangers, to the
foreground. Joyce shared these chapter headings with Stuart Gilbert and approved their
publication in a commentary, 13 which indicates that he intended readers to have them but wanted
them to find this information in an epitext and not the hypertext itself. Authors mask adaptations
not to permanently conceal their sources, but to encourage the dogged reader to unmask them.
When a scholar has exhausted the hypertext, paratexts, and epitexts and can find no
conclusive evidence that the author had a classical myth in mind while constructing the narrative,
she cannot classify the hypertext as an adaptation, no matter how tempting. It is not enough to
prove that an author was familiar with classical mythology or even that he read a specific myth.
Familiarity with a text does not guarantee that an author was consciously using a myth as a
hypotext when writing, even when the connection is tauntingly obvious. To do so would be to
read against the grain of the author’s intent, to read the text as an adaptation when the author has
not instructed the reader to do so. There are other analytical methods which do not assume that
the author must acknowledge his mythic usage, including the intertextuality, reception, and
typology methods described in later chapters. But to insist without convincing evidence that an
author knowingly worked with a mythic hypotext and concealed it is beyond the scope of the
adaptation model. Authors are innocent of mythic collusion until they confess they are guilty.

Identifying the Hypotext

Readers should also consider which version of a hypotext they use when analyzing an
author’s work. Scholars, particularly classicists, will often turn to Greek and Latin editions as the
12
13

Hom. Od. 12.184–91.
Stuart Gilbert, James Joyce’s Ulysses (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), viii–ix.
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comparative hypotext. It is usually safe to assume that the author would have consulted the
hypotext in the original language for anything written more than one hundred years ago, when
knowledge of classical languages was widespread. The edition an author uses may result in
nuanced differences that surface in the hypertext, and scholars may want to work with the same
edition for the best precision. It is also important to assess which version of a myth the author is
referencing. A use of the Orestes story, for instance, could come from Homer, Aeschylus,
Sophocles, Euripides, or some combination of the four. Adaptation focuses on finding specific
hypotext(s) for comparison.
However, many modern authors no longer learn classical languages and rely on
translations for the hypotext. This makes the translator an intermediate interpreter, and the
classicist’s penchant for assuming the Greek or Latin edition is the most reliable hypotext may
lead him astray when analyzing an adaptation. An author can also use “a generally circulated
cultural memory” 14—preserved in various retellings, encyclopedias, mythology guides,
textbooks, etc.—as a substitute for a hypotext. Margaret Atwood, for instance, wrote her
Penelopiad (2005) using both E. V. Rieu’s translation of the Odyssey (1945) as well as Robert
Graves’ The Greek Myths (1955) and other secondary sources rather than the primary Greek
source. 15 Atwood names her sources, but many authors are content to reference a myth without
specifying which specific version they drew from. Scholars might then default to the GrecoRoman originals when looking for a hypotext, keeping in mind that the author may not have
referenced them directly. This is one of the limits of the adaptive model; it can only work with
direct and acknowledged antecedents and is less able to account for broader intertextual

14
15

John Ellis, “The Literary Adaptation,” Screen 23 (May–June 1982): 3.
Margaret Atwood, Penelopiad (Edinbourgh: Canongate, 2008), 197.
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relations. However, when possible, identifying the translations or other sources an author used or
had access to can help understand nuances which emerge in the hypertext.

Tension Between Adaptation and Originality

The adaptation model assumes the author has made clear his intention to rework a mythic
hypotext and that this intention is unambiguous to the reader. While aspects of interpretation
may be uncertain, the presence of a specific hypotext theoretically should be unquestionable. Yet
in practice matters are not always so simple. Sometimes the hypertext and paratext of a work
invite a reading as an adaptation, but the author’s comments in the epitext contradict this
invitation. Such is the case for Joel and Ethan Coen’s film O Brother, Where Art Thou? (2000).
The film is a named adaptation of Homer’s Odyssey and yet the directors deny having ever read
the epic poem, even in translation. 16 They do so in order to not be beholden to Homer and to
claim artistic skill that is original and not derivative.
The Coen brothers refuse to acknowledge direct knowledge of their classical source.
Numerous places in the text, paratext, and epitext indicate that the brothers invite viewers to
watch the film as an adaptation of the Odyssey. In an interview two years before the film’s
release, the Coens noted that they wanted to make “an American version of the Odyssey.” 17 The
film itself opens with the first three lines of the epic modified from Robert Fitzgerald’s
translation, 18 and the opening credits proclaim that the film is “based upon ‘The Odyssey’ by
Homer.” The main character is a fast-talking, fraudulent lawyer named Ulysses Everett McGill

Jonathan Romney, “Double Vision,” in The Coen Brothers: Interviews, ed. William Rodney Allen (Jackson:
University of Mississippi, 2006), 127.
17
Andy Lowe, “The Brothers Grimm,” in The Coen Brothers: Interviews, 99.
18
Janice Siegel, “The Coens’ O Brother, Where Art Thou? And Homer’s Odyssey,” Mouseion 7, no. 3 (2007): 213.
16

11

(i.e. Odysseus) whose wife’s name is Penny (i.e. Penelope). While journeying home after
escaping from a chain gang, he and his companions meet enchanting women singing by the river
(later explicitly called sirens), who ostensibly transform one of Everett’s friends into a toad (a
Circe reference). They encounter a one-eyed Bible-salesman who roughs them up and steals
from them (a Cyclops reference). Later the same man is almost blinded when they hurl a
sharpened flag pole at his face, a clear reference to Odysseus’ blinding of Polyphemus. There is
even an allusive bust of Homer in the mise-en-scène of a restaurant. All indicate that the Coens
have a strong knowledge of the Homeric hypotext.
Because O Brother adapts the Homeric hypotext so well, some critics doubt that the Coen
brothers are being truthful and in fact read the Odyssey quite closely while writing the script;
after all, authors can lie and are especially liable to do so when it serves their artistic image. 19
For the Coens, not acknowledging the Odyssey as a direct source adds an air of ambiguity to
their film, which is consistent with their refusal to interpret their own work. Such a deception
would also allow them more artistic license with the Odysseus story than viewers might
otherwise condone, as the Coens make clear:
Ethan: We avail ourselves of [the Odyssey] very selectively . . .
Joel: Whenever it’s convenient we trot out the Odyssey.
Ethan: But I don’t want any of those Odyssey fans to go to the movie expecting,
y’know…
Joel: “Where’s Laertes?” [laughter]
Ethan: Where’s his dog?” [more laughter] 20

19
20

Siegel, “The Coens’ O Brother, Where Art Thou?,” 213–14.
Romney, “Double Vision,” 135–36.
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The Coens are concerned with a frequent expectation made of adaptations; some audiences
demand a high degree of fidelity to the classical work, 21 and the Coens know their adaptation of
the Odyssey departs significantly from Homer’s hypotext. By disavowing the Odyssey as a direct
hypotext in their interviews—despite directly naming the hypotext in their paratexts and in the
text proper—the Coens seek to give themselves space for creativity. They are not telling
Homer’s Odyssey, but rather the Coens’ “Odyssey.” While literalist viewers may insist on
Homeric accuracy, most others believe that “adaptation is repetition, but repetition without
replication.” 22 Purposeful infidelities are at the core of successful adaptations.

Example: Baroque Binaries in El laurel de Apolo

Pedro Calderón de la Barca’s El laurel de Apolo (written in 1657, first performed in
1658) is one of several plays which the court playwright based on mythological hypotexts. As
the title suggests, Calderón here adapts the Daphne and Apollo story from Ovid’s
Metamorphoses. The source-text is unambiguous; not only does the title give a clear indication,
but the core characters and plot remain largely unaltered and some sections are Spanish
paraphrases of Ovid’s Latin. As H. M. Martin remarks, “Calderon follow[s] Ovid with
remarkable fidelity.” 23 Yet Calderón creates no mere retelling of the myth; he expands Ovid’s
129 lines into a full production in the new genre of the zarzuela, which combines spoken and
sung lines. José Manuel Losada Goya notes that:

Hutcheon, A Theory of Adaptation, 122–23.
Ibid, 7.
23
H. M. Martin, “The Apollo and Daphne Myth as Treated by Lope de Vega and Calderon,” Hispanic Review 1,
vol. 2 (1933): 160.
21
22
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En efecto, si bien es verdad que ha conservado lo esencial de los modelos griego y latino,
el autor da muestras de una extraordinaria facilidad para modificar aquí y allá los
elementos que más le convienen. 24
[In effect, while it is true that he has conserved the essence of the Greek and Latin
models, the author shows signs of an extraordinary facility to modify here and there the
elements that are most convenient for him].
In adapting the text to baroque tastes, Calderón develops and magnifies the antithetical binaries
represented by Apollo and Cupid and mirrors them in new minor characters and sub-plots. The
result is a hyper-focus on the themes of love and disdain reflected from multiple angles in
governance, popularity, and control.
One of Calderón’s most effective innovations on Ovid is to take the conflict between love
and disdain and multiply it throughout the subplots and minor characters of the play, allowing
him to revisit the struggle again and again. According to A. Valbuena-Briones:
La obra se basa en un sistema de opuestos, con dualidad de funciones, que confiere al a
acción singular dinamismo. El eje de este juego conflictivo es la oposición: ApoloCupido. La división binaria sirve para reunir a los personajes en dos grupos, de acuerdo
con la fidelidad al concepto del desdén o del amor. Los cambios de actitudes emocionales
añaden interés dramático al espectáculo barroco. 25
[The work is based on a system of opposites, with a duality of functions, which confers
the action with a singular dynamism. The axis of this agonistic game is the opposition:
Apollo-Cupid. The binary division works to gather the characters into two groups, in

José Manuel Losada Goya, “Calderón de la Barca: El laurel de Apolo,” Revista de Literatura 51.102 (Jul 1989):
486.
25
A. Valbuena-Briones, “El tema del laurel de Apolo en Calderón,” in Calderón and the Baroque Tradition, eds.
Kurt Levy, Jesús Ara and Gethin Hughes (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University, 1985), 21.
24
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accordance with loyalty to the concept of disdain or love. The changes in emotional
attitudes add dramatic interest to the baroque spectacle].
One illustration of this binary is how Calderón adds two minor suitors for Daphne: the
shepherds Céfalo and Silvio. The first declares, “nací más al estudio inclinado que al amor” [I
was born more inclined for study than for love] and “negué una y otra deidad de Amor y Venus,
y sólo en las cátedras de Apolo mantuve me libertad” [I denied the divinity of both Love and
Venus, and only through the professorship of Apollo did I maintain my liberty]. 26 Thus Céfalo
begins the play aligned with the restraint associated with Apollo and ignores Daphne’s amorous
interests in him. Silvio, on the other hand, begins, “Yo más ciencias no aprendí que el arte de
amar” [I did not learn any more sciences than the art of loving]. 27 He is aligned with Cupid and
has pursued Daphne, though she is not interested in him. Calderón has made Ovid’s mismatched
couple into a more complex love triangle. Yet Céfalo admits that he has contemplated pursuing
Daphne, while Silvio is growing weary of waiting for her to notice him. The two men, painted as
opposites, are preparing to trade roles. Daphne, oddly enough, first plays the role of Cupid and
encourages them to reverse their affections if they wish to receive her gratitude for saving her
from a dragon. She demands that Céfalo feign affection while Silvio must pretend to feel nothing
for her. Later in the second act, when Apollo and Cupid spread forgetfulness and love through
the air, both men are infected, and their feigned emotions become genuine. They serve as
foreshadowing of the emotional reversal Apollo and Daphne experience.
This same pattern of binary reversal is refracted throughout the play. Cupid calls on the
nymph Ecco to repeat the word “amor” [love], infecting the peasants with his power. Apollo
attempts to counter this effect by calling Iris to have the birds repeat “olvido” [forgetfulness] as
Pedro Calderón de la Barca, El laurel de Apolo, in Obras Completas, vol. 1, ed. Ángel Valbuena Briones (Madrid:
Aguilar, 1959), 2174.
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the antidote to love. Now those who loved hate, while those who hated love. The Rústico and
Bata are the representative example of this reversal of affections, who parallel the shepherds,
who in turn parallel Daphne and Apollo. Iris and Ecco return at the end of the play to perform
similar yet distorted roles. Apollo calls on Iris to stifle Daphne’s cries for help, a reprise of her
role as a messenger of “olvido.” Yet rather than countering love, she is now its agent so that
Apollo can consummate his lustful desires. Daphne calls upon Ecco to multiply her screams so
that someone will aid her, just as Ecco spread “amor” before. But now it is to thwart love so that
Daphne will not be raped and Apollo will remain unsatisfied. It is a delicious example of how
Calderón takes Ovid’s simple conflict between love and disdain and contorts it through a
baroque lens.
Calderón also has Daphne and Apollo meet before Cupid’s interference in their lives,
establishing Apollo’s initial disinterest and Daphne’s respect for the god before the emotional
reversal occurs. Martin believes this “continues to adulterate the pure original by representing
Daphne as infatuated with Apollo,” 28 while Denise DiPuccio says the change “makes her a more
vulnerable character and therefore adds dimension to her confrontations with love.” 29 However,
it is only after Cupid has struck Daphne that Ovid describes her antipathy towards men. The
reader never knows what Daphne thinks about love before the god influences her. Calderón
develops her as a normal maiden who first loves Céfalo, then Apollo. For his part Apollo is
flirtatious, but exhibits restraint, and when Cupid has Echo fill the air with love, he takes a hard
line against all things amorous. This is before Cupid has struck them with his arrows; Calderón is
creating a parallel with Céfalo and Silvio’s initial responses and eventual reversals. By having
Apollo and Daphne interact before Cupid interferes, Calderón makes the change in their
Martin, “The Apollo and Daphne Myth,” 150.
Denise DiPuccio, Communicating Myths of the Golden Age Comedia (London: Associated University Press,
1998), 160.
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emotional states all the starker through contrast. The restrained Apollo becomes maddened with
love, while the romantic Daphne comes to loath everyone.
This scene also uses adaptation to create dramatic irony through omens. As the villagers
and nymphs celebrate Apollo’s victory, Daphne advances to crown Apollo’s head with a wreath
of flowers, delighted that she has the honor of approaching the deity. But she accidentally drops
her wreath, leaving only her hands on Apollo’s head. Because the audience is familiar with the
Ovidian hypotext, this is an obviously ominous foreshadowing of Daphne’s transformation into
the laurel tree, where her branches will form Apollo’s wreath. Daphne senses this and is struck
with fear, but Apollo responds flirtatiously. Calderón uses both innovation upon and familiarity
with Ovid to create this foreshadowing.
The structure of the play is baroque not only in its reversals, but also in its irregular
parallels; the dragon Fitón is Apollo’s antagonist in the first act while Cupid is the parallel
challenger in the second. The descriptions of the dragon therefore allude also to Cupid as a
universal, dangerous, consuming force. The first act opens with “Huid, pastores, huid, / que anda
en el monte la fiera” 30 [Flee, shepherds, flee, for a beast roams through the forest], referring to
the dragon Fitón. In the beginning of the second act, Iris shouts a similar warning about Cupid to
the villagers: “Huid, porque anda otra fiera en el monte / y fiera más fiera en saña y rigor” 31
[Flee, for another beast roams the forest, and a beast more beastly in cruelty and harshness].
Ovid does not make the direct parallel between the Python and Cupid, though the later
Apollonius compares the god to a viperous monster. 32 It is when Psyche’s parents seek an oracle
from Apollo, and the deity, perhaps remembering his old quarrel with Cupid, gives a truthful but
misleading description of Love:
Calderón, El Laurel de Apolo, 2173.
Ibid, 2184.
32
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Nec speres generum mortali stirpe creatum,
sed saevum atque ferum vipereumque malum 33
[Do not hope for a son-in-law born of mortal stock, but a cruel and wild and serpentine
evil]
Calderón seems to be drawing on similar language (cf. “fiera en saña y rigor” with “saeuum
atque ferum”) to describe Cupid. The direct comparison between the Python and Cupid also
allows him to unify the disparate stories more closely than Ovid’s narrative, highlighting the raw
and cruel power of love through baroque parallelism.
Calderón’s version also reframes the conflict in terms of political rulership, adapting the
tale for the concerns of his royal audience. Ovid does not state why Apollo slays the enormous
snake, but Calderón has the local Thessalian villagers pray to the nearby temples of Apollo and
Venus to send succor when they are tormented by the dragon, and the gods come in response to
these prayers. The dragon’s origins likewise tie into political strife. In both accounts the serpent
rises from the aftermath of the global flood. Ovid’s flood narrative results from Lycaon’s
outrageous sacrilege of human flesh as well as a generally pervasive wickedness. Calderón’s
flood is also a divine punishment of the people, but for the sin of visiting the necromancer Fitón
for divinations rather than the temples of the gods, a betrayal of proper authority. The peasants
believe the dragon is the reincarnation of Fitón, which means that the pretender to the gods’
power, though defeated once, has not yet been destroyed. Where once he ruled the population
through wise oracles, he now controls them through fear and violence. Calderón has thus
changed the slaying of the Python into a political action. To destroy the beast is to destroy a rival
clamant to the throne, demonstrate the ruling class’ power to protect their subjects, and thereby

33
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solidify one’s position as rightful ruler. Though this has no historical parallel to Calderón’s
contemporaries, the mindset and problems which the gods face are monarchical in nature.
Other subtle changes further the political dimensions of the adaptation. Ovid has Apollo
and Cupid meet after Apollo has already slain the Python, but Calderón brings them together
when they are both hunting the dragon in answer to their subjects’ prayers. Rather than an
abstract question of honor, they are in direct competition for the accolades of their worshipers.
Cupid is publicly humiliated in Calderón’s version when he drops his bow and arrows in terror
upon seeing the dragon, whereas in Ovid he is privately insulted, and a large part of the play
revolves around swaying public opinion after this incident. Christopher Gascón notes that
Calderón “raises the stakes by making the rivarly a public event, eagerly observed by the
villagers and nymphs. By adding the element of the ‘¿Qué dirán?’ [what will they say?]
Calderón puts the honor of each god at stake.” 34 In other words, the gods are as conscious
of court politics and appearances as their seventeenth-century audience.
Calderón plays with the link between imperialism and Apollo imagery inherent in both
the Roman and the Spanish tradition. From early on Augustus made Apollo a symbol of his
imperial rule. In 28 B. C. E., he rebuilt his house as a temple complex for Vesta and Apollo, thus
linking his rule with Apollo. The mythic depictions in the new temple not only honored the god,
but mirrored Augustus’ achievements. 35 In this context Ovid’s Apollo takes on political
dimensions. Spain’s Hapsburg monarchs likewise had a long tradition of associating themselves
with Apollo, and Calderón taps into “myths of imperial propaganda already latent in the Ovidian

Christopher D. Gascón, “Musical Agency in Calderón’s El Laurel de Apolo,” Hispanofilia 180 (2017): 5.
Mary Beard, John North, and Simon Price, Religions of Rome: A History, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 199.
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version” 36 to both praise and caution his royal audience. The playwright can conveniently adapt
the same political symbolism to contemporary sensibilities.
To conclude, Calderón wrote Laurel expecting his audience to know and compare his
play with Ovid’s depiction of the Apollo and Daphne myth. The story remains essentially the
same with no great innovations in overarching plotlines, providing a familiar framework for the
audience. Yet the interior complexity showcases Calderón’s genius in melding baroque style
with classical myth. The pleasure of the adaptation arises from how the author reflects the
familiar story in unexpected places; the audience can watch the Apollo and Daphne story unfold
multiple times as the new supporting roles mimic it. Calderón also adapts the myth to the
political climate of the contemporary Spanish court, altering the motivations of the gods to suit
his audience. He strikes the careful adaptive balance between homage to the hypotext and
creativity in the hypertext.

Julio Vélez-Seinz, “Eros, Vates, Imperium: Metamorphosing the Metamorphoses in Mythological Court Theatre
(Lope de la Vega’s El Amor enamorado and Calderón’s Laurel de Apolo,” in Ovid in the Age of Cervantes, ed.
Frederick De Armas (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 228, 239.
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Chapter 2: Allusion
Mythic allusions are brief evocations of a classical text through naming, quoting, or
retelling within an unrelated story or poem. They are advantageous because they are succinct and
semantically dense, making them a rich rhetorical technique. Perhaps the largest distinction
between adaptation and allusion is the scope of impact; unlike Hutcheon’s qualification for
adaptations, 37 mythic allusions are not sustained throughout an entire work. Instead they are “a
local small-scale device” 38 or “a brief, local phenomenon” 39 which impact the immediate context
in which they are used without necessarily influencing the work as a whole. While adaptations
rely heavily on a hypotext as a foundation for meaning—the substance of the textual meal—
allusions are a sparingly-used spice. They are distinct, detectable, and can even point towards the
overall meaning of the work, but they are peripheral rather than central.
Compared with other forms of mythic usage, allusions are an oddity. They are peppered
throughout the western literary tradition, yet because of their brevity they are rarely studied at
length. The methodologies of analysis discussed in other chapters focus on sustained and
substantial connections between the new text and ancient predecessors, while allusions offer only
passing commentary. Yet an understanding of how authors employ classical myth would not be
complete without addressing how common allusions shape post-classical texts. Distinguishing
between significant and insignificant mythic usages is also important when analyzing texts lest
scholars place too much meaning on classical schemata beyond what the evidence in the text can
support. Treating allusions as light touches to the base text is the key to understanding them.
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Function

Allusions evoke the memory of classical myths without retelling them, and this power of
suggestion is why they hold aesthetic appeal. In this way they differ from adaptations; a
hypertext is a retelling of a hypotext, and to read an adaptation is to retrace the first myth in the
process. Adaptations present the whole classical myth in altered form, rebuilding the context of
the myth as it travels along the well-worn narrative road. But when a reader encounters an
allusion, the narrative before and after the allusion does not refer to the myth. The reader
suddenly encounters the myth as an unexpected crossroad to the story he is currently reading; the
new narrative and the classical myth intersect briefly before both continue their separate ways.
Yet the reader has walked down the classical road before and is familiar with where it begins and
where it ends. Should he pause at the crossroads, he will recall the road’s full length. As Susan
Stewart explains:
By the devices of allusion, the past is “brought to bear” on the present as if that past were
somehow distant, now appearing in the situation with an accompanying flood of
signification. The goal of the nostalgic situation is to give rise to tradition; to evoke
tradition from the past, surrounded inimitably by its pastness. 40
The classical myth with all its richness of signification is brought to the fore of the reader’s
mind. However, the reader only crosses a small section of the myth while traversing the new
narrative. Because allusions are brief and narrow usages of myth, they allow only certain aspects
of the myth to pass into the new text. Even though the entirety of the myth is evoked, only a
small portion of it will be relevant to make sense of the allusion.
Susan Stewart, “The Pickpocket: A Study in Tradition and Allusion,” MLN 95, no. 5, Comparative Literature
(Dec. 1980): 1129.
40
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The context which the author places around the allusion is key to interpreting its
meaning, as “considerable contextual setting is required for the allusion to succeed.” 41 For
example, a musician could be called “a second Orpheus” and the reader is to understand that the
man has an extraordinary gift for music or can enrapture his audience. On the other hand, a
lawyer could also be called “a second Orpheus,” but here the reader should understand the man’s
persuasive skills are extraordinary. In this way allusions “subtly reinforce or qualify the phrase
or other limited context in which they are manifested.” 42 The author determines which aspects of
the myth the new text absorbs by controlling the context around the allusion.
While the author sets up the context around an allusion to predispose the reader towards a
certain interpretation, the reader must still make an intuitive leap to understand the allusion’s
significance. When an author writes “the musician was a second Orpheus” instead of “the
musician was so skilled in music that he held his audience spellbound,” the reader must
somehow translate the allusive phrase into the second, direct phrase. As William Irwin explains,
allusions are:
references that, for their correct understanding, depend crucially on something more than
mere substitution of a referent. Certain associations are to be made . . . We are supposed
to make unstated associations, and in this sense the reference is indirect . . . . We are
asked to fill in the missing piece of a puzzle, to draw on some knowledge to complete the
written or spoken word in our own minds. 43
Allusions thus use classical myths to encode meaning, and the reader must use his ingenuity and
knowledge of the classical tradition to crack the code. Part of the pleasure of allusions is for the
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reader to make this interpretive leap into sure understanding. And while only one aspect of the
myth may complete the meaning of the allusion, secondary aspects of the myth still linger in the
reader’s mind, briefly dyeing the text with mythic connotations. A musician compared to
Orpheus may add tints of grandeur or tragic loss or great yet futile power. Some of these
secondary associations will also be applicable to the character and broader text, enriching the
narrative, while other associations will fade because they are irrelevant to the surrounding
narrative. All these associations are suggested rather than stated.

Types of Allusion

There are various types of allusions, which can be explicit, either by drawing on a known
name or a quoted phrase from an ancient mythic text, or can be subtle, hinting or suggesting at
mythic stories without naming them. The easiest to identify use proper nouns (She shot like
Artemis) or unambiguous periphrasis (She shot like the silver-bowed Huntress). Difficulty arises
when the periphrasis is vague (She shot her bow like a goddess); here the author could intend
Artemis, but there are other archer goddesses in the world. The author may or may not have
intended the reader to make the classical connection.
In some cases, particularly in modern popular works where the author does not expect the
reader to be familiar with classical mythology, the author may have a narrator or character
recount the myth within the text. While not as brief as traditional allusions, these retellings still
serve the same purpose. They can function as an in-text footnote, and after the author has made
the reader aware of the myth through a retelling, the reader is still expected to make associations
between the retelling and the context in which it is given.
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A more complicated form of allusion is what Gregory Machacek calls “brief
phraseological adaptations,” 44 though I will call them phraseological allusions so as not to
confuse them with Hutcheon’s sustained adaptations from the previous chapter. These
incorporate phrases from classical texts into new works; sometimes they are delineated
quotations such as epigraphs or noted aphorisms placed in a character’s speech. At other times
they are incorporated seamlessly, perhaps stealthily, into the text as the author’s own words. For
these incorporated phrases to work as allusions, the reader must be familiar enough with classical
texts to recognize their origin. This can be difficult, especially since classical phraseological
allusions are usually translated from Greek or Latin into a modern language; phrases may seem
similar but are never exact duplicates. An author can take this infidelity a step further and
deliberately alter the phrase, slightly misquoting to highlight a new meaning by contrast. 45 This
can make phraseological allusions almost impossible to identify with certainty.
One possible phraseological allusion is in the beginning of Thomas Mann’s Doktor
Faustus. When introducing the protagonist Adrian, the narrator says he was “vom Schicksal so
furchtbar heimgesucht” 46 [by fate so terribly afflicted], which seems to verbally echo a line from
the Aeneid introducing Aeneas, who was “fato profugus” 47 [by fate an exile]. Both phrases
describe the protagonist, both occur in the opening lines of their respective works, and both are
syntactically similar, using “fate” in an oblique case (dative in the German, ablative in the Latin)
to show agency or cause followed by an adjectival noun or phrase. The interpretive leap the
reader is to make is that Adrian, like Aeneas, is fated for greatness, but only through tragic
suffering. Mann alters the nature of this suffering, however. Instead of “profugus,” Adrian will
Machacek, “Allusion,” 523.
Ibid, 528.
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be “heimgsucht,” driven to madness by a venereal disease and his own genius. Both conditions
are transformed through the allusion to Aeneas into unescapable, aggrandizing fate. While this
connection is possible, this allusion can never be certainly proven. Mann does not set apart the
phrase from the rest of his prose; it flows as his narrator’s own speech (though that narrator is,
perhaps tellingly, a classicist). Mann leaves it to the reader to identify and unpack the phrase
without any further hints, as is normally the case with phraseological allusions.

Authorial Intent

This leads into the question of authorial intent, which is difficult to establish for allusions.
They work through suggestion, and the reader must interpret their meaning. Yet the more
difficult challenge can be determining whether an author intended a classical allusion at all.
Allusions with proper nouns, unambiguous periphrasis, or delineated phrases are clearly
intentional, as are retellings. But ambiguous periphrasis and incorporated phraseological
allusions could be intentional or not.
For example, Edgar Allan Poe asks in his “Sonnet— To Science” how science can be
loved when it will not leave the man “To seek for treasure in the jewelled skies, / Albeit he
soared with an undaunted wing.” 48 The concept of a man flying to the sky on “undaunted” wings
may be an allusion to Icarus. Like the boy who defies the advice of the scientific-minded
inventor and reaches romantically for the sun, the man in the poem ignores rationalism and seeks
the older myths. But by ignoring scientific reality, he also has Icarus’ doomed air; reality will
force him back to earth as surely as Icarus once his wings melt. Poe uses this allusion to
Edgar Allan Poe, “Sonnet—To Science,” in The Selected Writings of Edgar Allan Poe, ed. G. R. Thompson (New
York and London: W. W. Norton, 2004), 22.
48
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acknowledge that nostalgia for classical myths as reality is dangerous, though he seems to think
the enchantment is worth the risk. But the allusion, if it is such, is not direct; Icarus is not
mentioned by name, nor is there identifiable iconography such as wax wings or references to the
sun. There is no way to prove that Poe intended the reader to read an allusion to Icarus here.
Irwin insists that allusion “requires authorial intent; it is a necessary condition.” He
differentiates between conscious and unconscious intent, specifying that if the author were asked
about a potential allusion in his work, he would be able either to say he intended it consciously
or acknowledge in hindsight that he must have unconsciously made the connection. However,
Irwin judges that “an accidental association on the part of the reader” that was not intended by
the author does not count as an allusion. 49 The difficulty with this system is that it relies on the
author explaining each non-overt allusion, which few authors are inclined to do. Scholars cannot
ask Poe if he intended an allusion to Icarus, after all. And unlike adaptations, authors rarely take
time to explain each allusion in their paratexts and epitexts. It is often impossible to prove these
distinctions when the author is dead or reticent, making Irwin’s taxonomy more theoretical than
practical.
For authorial intent there are therefore two categories: obviously intentional allusions and
possibly intentional allusions. When dealing with the second category scholars cannot prove with
certainty that the author intended a classical allusion but may assume its presence and put
forward a plausible interpretation.

49

Irwin, “What is an Allusion?,” 290–92.

27

Significance

Not all allusions are created equal, and there can be “considerable differences in the
intertextual intensity” 50 from one allusion to another. Significance refers here to the scope of
impact an allusion has on the interpretation of the work. Some allusions are so insignificant that
a reader can ignore them without altering the overall meaning of the work. Others are central to a
work’s interpretation, hinting at important themes or story points, and some allusions are so
significant that they reveal a full-scale adaptation of a classical myth. Thus when analyzing an
allusion, it is important to understand the variations of significance.
At the simplest level allusions function as learned adjectives, where the reference
explains an aspect of a character’s personality or physical appearance (“he was an Adonis” for
“he was young/beautiful/desirable”) or the situation in which a character finds himself 51
(“between Scylla and Charybdis” for “a dilemma”). These allusions have a limited reach,
coloring the meaning of a sentence or a paragraph at most. Even if the reader is unfamiliar with
the myth, he could probably glean the meaning through the context around the allusion.
These allusions are usually not thematically significant. While any reference to classical
myth draws the reader’s mind to ancient antecedents, at times an author will throw in classical
allusions as a rhetorical garnish which is meant to decorate but not bestow additional meaning.
For example, Louisa May Alcott calls the sisters in her novel Little Women “Hebes” 52 when they
serve drinks at a wedding. The allusion is an apt one: it comments on the youth and beauty of the
H. J. Hebel, “Towards a Descriptive Poetics of Allusion,” in Intertextuality, ed. Heinrich Plett (Berlin: W. de
Gruyter, 1991), 147.
51
Antony Keen, “The ‘T’ Stands for Tiberius: Models and Methodologies of Classical Reception in Science
Fiction,” Memorabilia Antonina, 10 April 2006, http: tonykeen.blogspot.com/2006/04/t-stands-for-tiberius-modelsand.html, accessed 11 Sep. 2018.
52
Louisa May Alcott, Little Women, eds. Anne K. Phillips and Gregory Eiselein (New York and London: Norton,
2004), 201.
50

28

sisters and their office as servers and compares the lighthearted atmosphere of the wedding to
that of the gatherings on Olympus. It also draws attention to the lack of alcohol the girls are
serving, which allows for a digression on temperance. But this allusion is not meant to tie into
the book’s larger themes. Instead it is to be remarked and then passed over, a mere flourish.
These mythic usages are usually not worth pursuing beyond explanatory footnotes for new
readers.
As is often the case, the conventions of a device are easiest to see when they are
exaggerated in parody. One mythic allusion in the second chapter of Miguel de Cervantes’ Don
Quixote is effective precisely because it is not significant nor appropriate. The would-be knight
has sallied forth for the first time into the world and composes his own illustrious (and
overblown) introduction for the history which a great author will one day write:
Apenas había el rubicundo Apolo tendido por la faz de la ancha y espaciosa tierra las
doradas hebras de sus hermosos cabellos, y apenas los pequeños y pintados pajarillos con
sus harpadas lenguas habían saludado con dulce y meliflua armonía la venida de la rosada
aurora, que, dejando la blanda cama del celoso marido, por las puertas y balcones del
manchego horizonte a los mortales se mostraba, cuando el famoso caballero don Quijote
de la Mancha, dejando las ociosas plumas, subió sobre su famoso caballo Rocinante, y
comenzó a caminar por el antiguo y conocido campo de Montiel. 53
[The rubicund Apollo had barely stretched over the face of wide and spacious earth the
golden strands of his beautiful hair, and the small and painted little birds with their harplike tongues had barely greeted with sweet and mellifluous harmony the coming of the
rosy dawn, who, leaving the soft bed of her jealous husband, through the doors and
balconies of the Manchegan horizon showed herself to mortals, when the famous knight
53
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don Quixote of la Mancha, leaving lazy feathers, mounted upon his famous horse
Rocinante, and began to walk through the old and familiar field of Montiel].
Here don Quixote references both Apollo and Dawn, drawing on classical knowledge to compare
these deities to the sunrise. Yet none of the classical stories about Apollo or Dawn give any
additional insight into the themes of the work; it would be a needless chase down a rabbit hole to
insist they are significant. Instead these are allusions to the epic genre (and its successor, the
renaissance romance) rather than a specific mythic narrative. Cervantes employs bathos,
comparing the mundane and ridiculous life of don Quixote to the great heroes that populate the
stories which begin with such classical allusions. The style is out of place, just like don Quixote
himself. In the parodic text, the allusion functions ironically by way of contrast precisely because
it is ill-fitting.
When analyzing mythic allusions, scholars may be greatly tempted to read too much of
the ancient myth into the new text. Classical allusions give a familiar tint to a new story, but do
not overpower the new plot and themes. Once a scholar finds one named parallel, the natural
impulse is to seek “a literal, consistent, one-to-one correspondence between [all] characters.” 54 If
the author briefly compares a businessman to Agamemnon, his wife may seem to be a
Clytemnestra, his mistress a Cassandra, his son an Orestes, his daughter an Electra, and his
arrogant but physically-underwhelming rival at the office, an Achilles. While the author may
have invoked the allusion only to convey the businessman’s leadership skills, the scholar has run
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with it and fabricated an entire system of equivalents. 55 Unfortunately such connections strain
credibility; an allusion or even a series of allusions is not the same as an adaptation.
On a more complex level, allusions can explain central themes without overwhelming the
distinct flavor of the author’s work. An author can derive a central theme from a classical text
and use an allusion to signify it, but the plot may be entirely different from the classical myth. Or
he might transplant 56 a single character from the mythic world and identify her as such through a
classical allusion, but she is not a central character or her story differs so much from her classical
origins that the scholar cannot use the adaptation model. Allusions in this way are always
characterized by their limitations.
In other cases, allusions are so central that they signal the presence of an adaptation.
Normally an allusion by itself can only comment on the immediate context in which it is found.
But if it is coupled with plots, themes, and characters taken from the same myth, and these
devices form the main substance of the work, then the allusion is the author’s acknowledgement
of adaptation. Allusions in the paratext, such as titles, often signal an adaptation. Joyce’s
Ulysses, discussed in the previous chapter, is one such example. Main characters named for
classical characters can sometimes indicate an adaptation as well, though this is not always the
case. A scholar must determine if the allusion points to classical plots and themes sustained
throughout the work or if it has a more limited and localized reach.
There exists an intermediate step between a centralized allusion and a full adaptation. An
author can use a series of allusions from the same myth, strategically placed throughout a work,
to create a leitmotif. As Craig Kallendorf notes, “The most richly rewarding allusive contact will
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be systematic, one of a number of references that contribute substantially to meaning.” 57 This
allusive chain strengthens the intertextual, thematic connection between ancient myth and
modern text beyond the single use of an allusion. Each allusion serves its usual purpose of
coloring the local meaning. But because there are multiple allusions to the same myth in different
parts of the narrative, it invites the reader to compare these allusive moments to one another.
Allusions draw these points of contact together into focus while the other narrative elements
found in between the points which are not tinged by the allusion fall away. They form an
emergent pattern that would otherwise be obscured. The classical myth serves as an interpretive
key not only to each individual allusion, but to a larger allusion that becomes apparent only
through the examination of multiple, interconnected points. While the mythic narrative is still
secondary to the main story-line (and therefore not an adaptation), it serves as a strong
commentary on the new text through comparison and contrast.
Judging the level of significance of an allusion to the overall text is important because it
determines the best analytical approach to take. Ornamental allusions should not be overtaxed to
bear extended significance. Thematic allusions should not be passed over when they hold
important clues to the text’s overall structure and meaning. Determining the difference between
the two can be critical in understanding the allusion’s impact on the text.
Knowing the purpose of the allusion, the type, the author’s possible intent, and the scope
of its significance can help the reader analyze how the author incorporates a classical myth in
small and nuanced ways. Readers often misunderstand the significance of allusions when
compared to other usage categories of classical mythology. Either references are so small that
they are overlooked and discounted or they are strained to create a system of meaning that is
Craig Kallendorf, “Allusion as Reception: Virgil, Milton, and the Modern Reader,” in Classics and the Uses of
Reception, eds. Charles Martindale and Richard F. Thomas (Malden, Maine: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 69.
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beyond the ability of the text to support. An allusion’s power is in its subtlety and its smallness.
Through light flavoring of a text, often barely noticeable, allusions evoke classical referents that
help shape the overall texture of the work. They are one ingredient that makes up the larger
creative meal and should not be taken for granted.

Example: Playing Orpheus in Miguel de Unamuno’s Niebla

Miguel de Unamuno’s novel Niebla (1914) is an original story about an independently
wealthy gentleman who suffers from too much existential thought. It is not an adaptation of the
Orpheus narrative, but it does incorporate several allusions to the Orpheus myth. Most notably
the protagonist Augusto finds a puppy whom he names Orfeo, and he keeps the dog as someone
to listen to his monologues. After Augusto dies, the dog delivers a funeral oration before
following his master into death. The allusions never overwhelm Unamuno’s original story, but
they comment on the central theme of death and the desire for continued existence. When taken
together they form an allusive chain that reveals a metanarrative of how Augusto affects a heroic
purpose by reenacting the Orpheus role.
Scholars have noted the allusion in Orfeo’s name, though treatments of it have been brief.
While Alexander Parker is the first to provide an extended treatment of Orfeo, he makes no
reference to the significance of the dog’s name. 58 Gayana Jurkevich examines Orfeo briefly
through an archetypal lens, noting Orpheus’ role as a “Wise Old Man” figure who aids the
protagonist. In this sense the dog serves as the mediator between Augusto and the rest of the
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world as well as a manifestation of Augusto’s subconscious. 59 Robin Fiddian, by contrast,
focuses on Orpheus’ powers to resurrect, first as a manifestation of Augusto’s desire to resurrect
his mother, and then as a means of resurrecting Augusto himself, since “Orfeo’s passage into the
realm of the dead is followed years later by the appearance of Augusto in the dreams of
Unamuno, as though the self-sacrifice of Orfeo had served at length to rescue Augusto from
nothing.” 60 Marsha Collins also notes the similarities between the Orpheus story and the dog’s
role, noting that “Unamuno’s Orfeo also bounds out of a foggy netherworld, loses his loved one
to death, and then regains Augusto after surcease of his own life.” But Collins focuses more on
Orpheus’ role as poet and the use of ambiguous language to create reality and obtain
immortality, as “Unamuno likewise immortalizes the mortal Augusto and Orfeo, and himself, in
his nivola.” 61 All of these scholars see the Orfeo allusion as pointing towards a central theme of
death and a desire for some form of resurrection or continuation of consciousness beyond death.
While these interpretations explore one aspect of the allusion to the Orpheus myth, other
related allusions operate in the relationship between Augusto and his love interest Eugenia. The
story of Orpheus and Eurydice is not limited to Augusto’s interaction with the dog but is subtly
woven throughout the romantic plotline. Perhaps because Augusto’s climactic encounter with his
own author at the end of the book is so innovative, the romantic plotline receives comparatively
little attention. However, Unamuno uses allusions to the Orpheus myth to highlight existential
themes in this overlooked section of the novel.
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The first allusion occurs before the reader meets Orfeo, within the first few pages. After
Eugenia crosses in front of Augusto’s door, he follows her home and sees her doorkeeper staring
at him maliciously. “Ésta Cerbera aguarda—se dijo—que le pregunte por el nombre y
circunstancias de esta señorita a que he venido siguiendo” 62 [“This Cerberus is waiting,” he said
to himself, “for me to ask her for the name and circumstances of this Miss whom I have come
following]. Taken alone this allusion would only be a flourish. It comments on the role of a
minor character whose purpose is functional rather than interesting; the doorkeeper is an obstacle
to Augusto’s advancement, a guardian like Cerberus. But when taken with the other Orpheus
allusions, Unamuno gives the first hint that he is playing with the Orpheus and Eurydice story.
Eugenia is a woman who is guarded beyond Augusto’s reach, and he must charm the ianitor
before he can gain access to her, much as Orpheus had to charm the three-headed Cerberus to
reach Eurydice.
The second allusion comes soon after, when Augusto finds a puppy stumbling out from
the mists: “Luego hizo Augusto que se le trajera un biberón para el cachorillo, para Orfeo, que
así le bautizó, no se sabe ni sabía él tampoco por qué” 63 [Then Augusto had them bring a bottle
for the little puppy, for Orpheus, for thus he christened him; it is not known nor did he himself
know why]. Unlike the earlier allusion to Cerberus, which was a rhetorical flourish, this allusion
to Orpheus points towards the central themes of death and existentialism. Several scholars have
noted how Orfeo serves as a double for Augusto, mirroring his innocence and inexperience. 64
Eugenia herself thinks of Augusto in canine terms, hating to look at “los ojos suplicantes del
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señorito don Augusto como los de un perro hambriento” 65 [the supplicating eyes of little mister
Augusto like those of a hungry dog]. Her remarks evoke the idea of Orfeo, who only a few
chapters earlier was found as a starving puppy in the streets. It is easy enough then to see
Augusto—via his connection with the dog—as an Orpheus figure as well, albeit a bumbling one.
By applying the allusive name to the dog, Unamuno also applies it to the protagonist, ensuring
that the mythic allusion is in a central position to comment on Augusto’s problems.
In both these cases of allusion, Augusto is the one to assign classical names to figures in
his life. He is tentatively trying to take control of his life and assume the role of author and actant
after the death of his mother. As Carlos Blanco Aguinaga states:
In order to try to be what he appears to be—he must follow the classic pattern of the plot.
He must because he wills it so, of course. Any plot—any role—would have been equally
satisfactory to him, I am sure, for all he wants is an opportunity to act . . . As Augusto
undoubtedly knows from having read Calderón, true freedom of the will consists in
recognizing one’s role and playing it well. 66
In other words, Augusto is trying to map a story onto his life in order to give it meaning. If he
can will himself into a role, he will escape his mother’s control as well as the as-yet-unknown
control of Unamuno as author. The question is, which story is he using as a model? His name is
another classical allusion to Augustus, which implies that he is destined for greatness and grand
deeds, but his situation as an aimless and unambitious man undercuts these pretentions of
empire. If anything, the allusion becomes ironic. Instead Augusto subconsciously follows the
pattern of the romantic Orpheus and Eurydice myth. He is the one naming others based on the
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Orpheus story. Ironically, this makes him both author and fictional character playing out a role in
his own story, a clever parallel of Unamuno’s later intrusion on the novel as a character.
Augusto seeks a damsel in distress that he can rescue and love so that he can affirm his
selfhood as an Orpheus figure. Yet Eugenia is in no kind of physical danger, so Augusto wishes
to rescue her from her poverty through marriage. All is well except that Eugenia refuses to play
her role, as she already has her boyfriend Mauricio and fully expects him to rescue her and not
Augusto. Eventually she plays along and agrees to marry Augusto for his money and plans to
leave him before the wedding.
The climax of the romantic plotline culminates in another possible Orphic allusion which
concentrates on Eugenia’s piercing look. In both Virgil and Ovid’s version of the myth, Orpheus
must not look at Eurydice while they ascend from the underworld, lest he lose her forever. Yet
when Eugenia brings up another of Augusto’s love interests—the laundry woman Rosario—to
bait Augusto into cancelling the wedding and saving face, it is she who does the looking: “¿No
has vuelto a saber de ella?—y le miró con mirada de las que atraviesan” 67 [“You haven’t heard
of her again?” and she looked at him with one of those piercing looks]. The cognate accusative
(miró con mirada) draws especial attention to her gaze. This portrays Eugenia as an active
Eurydice in what has traditionally been a passive role. Rather than be penetrated by the male
gaze and die as a result, she penetrates him to keep him from the shame that will eventually
cause his death. Unfortunately Augusto does not take the hint and Eugenia leaves him.
This allusion is far less certain than the others. Unamuno places this look right before
Augusto loses his love interest, just like Orpheus looking at Eurydice. But if it were not for the
earlier Cerberus and Orpheus allusions, this passage would not register as a possible Orpheus
allusion at all. It may well be an “accidental association on the part of the reader,” and there is no
67
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way to ask Unamuno whether he intended a clever reversal of the expected Orphic gaze. If the
reader chooses to take this as an allusion, however, it shows how Augusto’s will to existence
through the Orphic story unravels. As Yolanda Melgar Pernías explains:
Augusto, pues, planea afirmarse como sujeto, como “experimentador”, pero su debilidad
lo convierte en objeto . . . Vemos así que Augusto no puede superar la posición pasiva
respecto a la mujer, no es capaz de afirmarse autónomamente—de desgajarse de la niebla
que lo rodea. 68
[Augusto, then, plans to affirm himself as a subject, as an experimenter, but his weakness
changes him into an object . . . We see then that Augusto cannot overcome the passive
position in respect to women, he is not capable of affirming himself autonomously, of
breaking off from the mist which surrounds him].
Unlike Unamuno, who controls the will of all his characters through writing, or Orpheus, who
controls the will of even gods through music, Augusto cannot compel Eugenia to marry him. His
narrative as romantic hero is exposed as an affectation, as an overlay upon his nebulous and
formless life. He has played through the role of Orpheus, complete with losing his love interest,
and yet remains no more real than before. He was unable to look at Eugenia, to play the part of
active gazer, and instead passively accepts her gaze and her definitions of his self. His last effort
to will himself into existence is paradoxically to end his life, but Unamuno takes even the choice
of suicide from him. Augusto remains passive to the core.
However, it is important to note the ways in which Niebla does not adapt the Orpheus
myth. The plot is one of failed courtship, not the loss and recuperation of a lover. In Ovid’s
account, Orpheus asks only for a respite from death so that he might enjoy Eurydice for a mortal
Yolanda Melgar Pernías, “La identidad masculina de Augusto como génesis del conflicto en
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life span. Unamuno is concerned not with life or love but the inevitable cessation of
consciousness upon dying and the loss of the self. Thematically the two stories are only loosely
connected. In focusing on the Orphic allusions in the work, this analysis has necessarily drawn
excessive attention to the importance and effect the allusions have on Unamuno’s story. But
when placed back into the overall narrative, the effects of each allusion are localized and
minimal. Niebla is not an Orpheus adaptation, but rather a different story that uses the Orpheus
myth to point to the deeper existential questions that Augusto’s life raises. Augusto’s failure to
make the Orpheus narrative central, to adapt the Orpheus story as his own, reveals the periphery
position of the myth to Augusto’s questioned existence and to the narrative of Niebla. The
classical allusions hint at a greater meaning, a means of fulfillment and purpose through
connection and sacrifice, which the author then denies first through Eugenia’s rejection and then
by Unamuno’s indifference. Orpheus’ songs echo through the text without ever coming to the
fore.
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Chapter 3: Intertextuality
Thus far I have discussed mythic usages that connect demonstrably to their ancient
predecessors. Yet many usages lack overt signaling in the text and paratexts, which leads to
Joanna Paul’s question: “If a film has no clear link with classical antiquity (and how do we
discern and evaluate this ‘clarity’ anyway?), in what sense might we be able to understand it as a
reception of antiquity?” 69 If scholars cannot prove that an author was drawing on classical myth
during her writing (i.e. if authorial intent remains uncertain), do they have any grounds for
analyzing the text in terms of a mythological paradigm? Genette confronts a similar problem
when he knows a hypotext must exist, but has no way of consulting it:
We are most likely faced here with hypertexts whose hypotexts are unknown; we are
almost certain of their hypertextuality, but it remains beyond description for us and thus
beyond definition . . . The curious (and ever frustrated) readers find themselves in the
position of a paleographer who already knows that his text conceals another but does not
yet know which one. This is the most irritating palimpsest of all, which reduces me to
hunches and to questionings. 70
This uncertainty has not deterred scholars in their analyses of potential mythic usages.
Rather than use explicit references to a hypotext, they examine the work for “some core of
character and causation for its [mythic] narrative to be recognizable.” 71 This “core” or “spirit” 72
of the myth is notoriously difficult to define. It can be “salient parallels,” a connection to the
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myth which “reverberates” and “resonates” 73 or be “in tune with” the myth to the point that it is
“too [mythic] to be merely coincidental.” 74 In other words, these scholars are following LéviStrauss’ reasoning, who says, “a myth remains the same as long as it is felt as such.” 75 Scholars
assert connections between modern works and ancient myths based on how familiar the modern
work feels to an ancient story.
Most balk at a system of criticism based on feeling. Analysis may begin with an intuited
connection, but usually textual and historical evidence must substantiate the initial hypothesis.
But rather than search for a historical connection, as with masked adaptations, 76 a scholar can
instead assume the connection is present even when not provable. Adaptive and allusive models
are not applicable in this situation, but other indirect analysis methods can yield insightful
interpretations. Intertextuality, reception, and typology operate on the assumption that, although
the connection to classical myth is unattributed and unprovable, it is nevertheless probable. In the
case of the latter two methods, the scholar creates the connection through her own subjective
reading. Just as Hutcheon points out that the reader can derive pleasure from the contrast
between hypertexts and hypotexts, Sanders notes that “surely part of the pleasure of response for
readers in these instances consists in tracing these relationships for themselves.” 77 Scholars may
especially enjoy the challenge of sniffing out traces of classical myth when they are not so
readily apparent.
This chapter examines intertextuality, the idea that authors create texts by interweaving
previous texts. Julia Kristeva first introduced the term, who “saw art, music, drama, dance, and
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literature in terms of a living mosaic, a dynamic intersection of textual surfaces.” 78 According to
this theory, each text is made up of hundreds if not thousands of previous texts, almost all of
which are not formally acknowledged; to extend the theory to its extreme, “intertextuality speaks
a language whose vocabulary is the sum of all existing texts.” 79 Each new text carries within it
the entire history of its cultural tradition. While the theory first developed from semiotics and
explained how individual words carry meaning into new texts, “authors of literary works do not
just select words from a language system, they select plots, generic features, aspects of character,
images, ways of narrating, even phrases and sentences from previous literary texts and from the
literary tradition.” 80 Scholars can therefore use intertextuality to explain the relationship between
classical myths and subsequent usages, even when the classical text is an unacknowledged
contributor, since “the intertextual relationship may be less explicit, more embedded.” 81
While intertextuality does not require an explicit reference, it nevertheless works with
specific antecedent texts. A new text does not weave in the incest taboo, or even the Oedipus
story, but specific strands of Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus. An author can use multiple sources;
Eugene O’Neill’s adaptation of the Oresteia, for instance, draws on Aeschylus, Sophocles, and
Euripides’ versions of the story, as well as Sophocles’ Oedipus and Freud’s psychological
interpretations. The strands may become so interwoven that they are indistinguishable from a
distance, but careful examination reveals their discrete nature. Unlike typology, which uses
abstractions and general mythic strains, intertextuality traces the sources of a text through
concrete though unacknowledged vectors.
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What follows are three analogies to better understand how myths move into new works
through intertextuality: the genetic model, the subterranean model, and the textile model. Each
gives a slightly different perspective to the method, and when taken together allow for better
understanding of the theory.

Genetics

Myth can be described as “the common possession of a self-identifying culture group that
subsequent historical groups, up to today, continue to claim as ancestral.” 82 If classical myths are
the common ancestors of all Western stories, then whatever stories Westerners create will bear
the genetic imprint, however faint, of specific classical antecedents. 83 An extended analogy
between intertextuality and genetics can explore how mythic DNA is passed from one generation
of stories to the next.
A storyteller’s mind is like a uterus which combines different genetic material and
reforms it. However, instead of working with only two sources, authors can recombine the
fragments of any story they have ever heard and birth it into the world, where the story will in
turn procreate inside the mind of the next author. 84 This makes tracing the genealogy of any
story extremely complicated, as it may have dozens or even hundreds of parent stories. Classical
scholars are like genetic researchers who attempt to locate strands of classical texts in the DNA
of a story, sifting through countless influences to find them. Fortunately myths, like genre,
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contain “pieces of cultural memory in condensed form.” 85 Because of this density of meaning
they are frequently used in new stories and tend to be expressed as dominant rather than
recessive traits. Oedipus’ unfortunate marriage to his mother, for instance, tends to stand out
more than a narrative concerning a mundane trip to the barber. Once a classicist has identified
the mythic strain, the next step is to examine what pieces of the mythic text remain, what has
been removed, and how it combines with other genetic material to form a unique expression in
that story. In other words, how does the original meaning of the mythic text function within the
new overall context of the story?
This idea of genetic intertextuality assumes that older stories will leave what Kristeva
called “mnesic traces (memories). They are carried intact from their own space into the space of
the novel.” 86 Because traces remain intact, it is impossible to tell a story without invoking older
stories, including texts of classical myth. As Mikhail Bakhtin explains:
When a member of a speaking collective comes upon a word, it is not as a neutral word
of language, not as a word free from the aspirations and evaluations of others,
uninhabited by others’ voices. No, he receives the word from another’s voice and filled
with that other voice. The word enters his context from another context, permeated with
the interpretations of others. His own thought finds the word already inhabited. 87
Bakhtin’s idea can be especially useful when analyzing classical mythic usages. If individual
words carry the genetic traces of earlier usages when placed in new contexts, it is understandable
that stories do likewise. Every story about a musician who has lost a lover will carry traces of
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Vergil and Ovid’s Orpheus, and every wife who murders her husband is a descendant of
Aeschylus and Homer’s Clytemnestra. Stories are not created ex nihilo, after all; storytellers
combine and recombine stories that they have heard before. In some cases, the classical myths
are the parent, as the author read the ancient versions and based a story after it. In other cases the
author read only the story based off the ancient versions, or the story based on that story, and so
on. In this case the classical text may be like a grandparent or great-grandparent, with less direct
influence but with a yet-discernible genetic resemblance. Most if not all stories have been
combined with classical mythic DNA at some point in their ancestry. For this reason Lysl Walsh
can claim that “Homer’s Iliad and its narration of the conflict between the Greeks and the
Trojans, and Hector and Achilles, stands as the ur-text against which all subsequent tales of war,
friendship, and revenge can be compared.” 88
One example of this genetic dilution is the Pygmalion myth. Ovid’s version in the
Metamorphoses is a starting point and George Bernard Shaw’s adaptation Pygmalion (1913) is
one of the text’s second-generation progeny. The title of the play and the thematic interplay
between Ovid and Shaw’s versions would suggest that Shaw was aware of Ovid’s account and
used an adaptive model in writing his play. The reader is meant to compare Professor Higgins to
Pygmalion and derive meaning through the palimpsestuous relationship. When Alan Lerner
adapted the play into the musical My Fair Lady (1956), he removed references to the Pygmalion
myth. Because he would have read the play and seen the Pygmalion reference in the title, he
must have made a conscious decision to remove that reference, thereby creating a masked
adaptation in the third generation. Once the reference is masked, any further adaptations may be
based on Lerner’s work without an awareness of Ovid’s version. Therefore when Michael Price
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wrote the parodic episode “My Fair Laddy” (2006) for The Simpsons, any overt trace of the
Pygmalion myth is gone. The episode’s title makes it clear that it is an adaptation of Lerner’s
musical, but we cannot properly call it an adaptation of Ovid’s Pygmalion. However, this does
not mean that the Pygmalion myth is altogether absent from its fourth-generation descendant. It
still contains “mnesic traces,” fragments of thematic content which are inherited from the ancient
source like strands of genetic material. For this reason it is still useful to analyze the Simpsons
episode within an intertextual relationship with Ovid’s Pygmalion. After the story has been
cross-bred with many other narrative traditions, the fragments and themes that remain manifest
after so many retellings become especially significant to the interpretation of that work.

Subterranean

Intertextual relationships can be compared to the movements of a subterranean river. While it
may occasionally surface and travel above ground, for the most part it flows beneath the earth.
One could see two seemingly disparate stretches and not know they are the same river until
something is thrown into the segment upstream and it miraculously surfaces in the stretch
downstream. We know that the river is connected, but we are unable to see how.
Sanders makes the claim that “intertextuality operates in a subterranean mode, occurring
beneath the surface narrative.” 89 While the reader may not be able to see direct connections
between ancient myth and modern text, she may note similarities between the two, where aspects
such as plot, themes, and characters of the “upstream” classical text resurface in later
“downstream” literature. Antony Keen calls this ghosting, which are “stories where no direct
influence of classical originals can be established, but where nevertheless there are strong hints
89

Sanders, Adaptation and Appropriation, 104.

46

of themes derived from antiquity . . . However, this category is inherently nebulous, and such
connections can be difficult to establish.” 90 The genetic model of intertextuality can trace a
classical myth’s usage through links of filiation, while the subterranean model claims that
classical myths are imparted through less direct or less evident means. Scholars can never be sure
in this situation by what means an author received a classical myth, but they can examine several
possibilities of how classical myths transmit and reform while underground.
An author may have direct, conscious knowledge of a myth and deliberately use it in
crafting her story but conceal all direct evidence of the source text. This is another example of
Daugherty’s “masked” adaptation discussed earlier, except here the masking is so complete that
there is no way to prove that the author used a myth as a hypotext. The paratexts and epitexts are
bare. If a scholar wishes to assert that an author deliberately concealed a source text in this case,
he must do so on faith. A careful comparison of the new and ancient text may reveal an
intertextual relationship but can only guess at conscious adaptation. So long as the author
remains tightlipped about her sources, readers will never know for certain.
Alternately, an author may read an ancient text, either in Greek or Latin or in translation,
and then draw on it unconsciously while writing. Those who are trained in classics (be it the
British schoolboy of the nineteenth century, the classics professor, or the university student who
took a general education course in classical mythology) are particularly susceptible to
unconsciously channeling myth. According to Carl Jung, every source text an author has
encountered remains in the subconscious and informs future creative endeavors, but the author
need not be aware of this influence:
It can sometimes be shown convincingly that what he has written bears a striking
similarity to the work of another author—a work that he believes he has never seen. I
90
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myself found a fascinating example of this in Nietzsche’s book Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
where the author reproduces almost word for word an incident reported in a ship’s log . . .
I wrote to his sister, who was still alive, and she confirmed that she and her brother had in
fact read the book together when he was 11 years old. I think, from the context, it is
inconceivable that Nietzsche had any idea that he was plagiarizing this story. I believe
that fifty years later it had unexpectedly slipped into focus in his conscious mind. 91
Therefore an author familiar with classical mythology could rework it into a modern text, even
“almost word for word” and still not be cognizant of the action. In this case, authorial intent need
not be proved to justify the presence of a myth in a modern work, even when the author himself
does not recall reading the ancient versions of the myth.
In both these cases, authors have direct exposure to an ancient text, then consciously or
unconsciously draw on it in their writing. But authors can also have indirect exposure to myths,
which they then incorporate into their stories. Safran and Cyrino note:
Films frequently draw from myths that have become integrated into our wider cultural
discourse after percolating through the ages into story-patterns and archetypes . . . In such
cases where the myth in question may be fragmented or transmuted, the [scholar]
illuminates how, in the absence of overt signaling, a myth operates at a cellular level to
shape aspects of the screen text and becomes thrillingly recognizable upon explication of
its subterranean presence. 92
Intertextual mythic usages can be retellings of retellings of retellings, diffused in popular culture
and “in the water,” as it were. The precise point of origin and its trajectory into the current work
are untraceable, though real.
Carl Jung, “Approaching the Unconscious,” in Man and his Symbols, ed. Carl Jung (New York: Dell, 1964), 23–
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The classical tradition, which includes Greek and Roman texts and culture as well as their
continued influence in the post-classical world, is one of the source-waters for the broader river
of the Western cultural tradition. 93 Subsequent works are like tributaries off the Western
tradition. Because the classical tradition is upstream, all later texts mingle with classical
influence. This is inevitable, since “to write a poem or a novel is immediately to engage with a
literary tradition.” 94 Classical myth has irrevocably shaped the way Westerners tell stories to the
point that it is impossible to engage in artistic creation without drawing on them.
To continue the Pygmalion example from above, scholars can assume that any story
about crafting and then animating the perfect love interest has a trace of Ovid’s version by virtue
of its downstream location in the Western tradition. In the genetic example, scholars can trace
the presence of the Pygmalion myth from Ovid directly into the Simpsons. However, in the
episode “Dream Date” (1996) from the television series Sabrina the Teenage Witch (1996–
2003), the Pygmalion myth is present, but its origins are obscured. Sabrina and her aunts use
witchcraft to cook up perfect dates out of dough, which is more than coincidentally similar.
There is no way to trace the trajectory from Ovid, but it is reasonable that it would be possible if
only authors had documented the many small transmissions of the myth through the ages. Yet to
do so is as difficult as tracking an individual water molecule through a river. 95
It is easy to overlook these intertextual relations and exclude them from a “pure” classical
genealogy, but we risk losing some truly brilliant transformations of the classics. As Sarah Annes
Brown points out:
Cf. Gilbert Highet, The Classical Tradition, 541: “We have traced the river of Greek and Roman influence in
literature from its first mingling with the life of modern Europe.”
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Although most of the writers . . . seem to have derived their knowledge of the ‘classics’
from intermediate sources, or simply by cultural osmosis as it were, their lack of direct
scholarly engagement with the Latin and Greek originals in no way detracts from their
vitality as distinctive vectors of the classical tradition. 96
Not only do texts unwittingly absorb classical myth, but myth also flows through them as
channels into future works, making them valuable objects of study.
Subterranean intertextuality explains how authors can create texts that have an uncanny
resemblance to classical texts even though they have never picked up a classical book. This is
because “literature—like all other activities of wit—relies on conventions which, with some
exceptions, it is ignorant of.” 97 The story conventions themselves contain embedded myth.
A curious case of subterranean intertextuality is Gabriel Dawe’s Plexus series. Dawe uses
multi-colored threads to form large rainbow sculptures that seem to shimmer in the museum
light. While the individual threads are monochromatic, they overlap in layers and create the
illusion of colors blending into one another so that the viewer cannot determine where one color
ends and the next begins. Dawe’s sculptures can be seen as a reverse-ekphrasis of Ovid’s
description of weaving from the Arachne narrative:
illic et Tyrium quae purpura sensit aenum
texitur et tenues parvi discriminis umbrae;
qualis ab imbre solent percussis solibus arcus
inficere ingenti longum curvamine caelum;
in quo diversi niteant cum mille colores,
transitus ipse tamen spectantia lumina fallit:
Sarah Annes Brown, “‘Plato’s Stepchildren’: SF and the Classics,” in A Companion to Classical Receptions, 416.
Gérard Genette, Figures of Literary Discourse, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Columbia University Press,
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usque adeo, quod tangit, idem est; tamen ultima distant. 98
[Here both the purple which has felt the Tyrian bronze is woven and lighter shades of
small gradation. Just as rainbows often dye the long sky with their huge bend when the
sunrays are struck from a rainstorm, in which though a thousand variegated colors shine,
nevertheless the transition itself escapes the notice of the watching eyes. What touches is
continuously the same, but the ends differ.]
Ovid’s simile of colored threads as a rainbow is the “upstream” exposed point of the
underground river, which disappears and resurfaces two millennia later in Dawe’s sculpture,
which resembles a large loom prepped for weaving. While there is no visible connection between
the two points, there are untraceable connections through the Western tradition that filter down
from Ovid to Dawe. Ovid’s discourse was one of many voices that shaped the general portrayal
of rainbows, which Dawe then draws on.
Dawe admits that he has never read Ovid’s Metamorphoses but was aware of the story of
Arachne (perhaps through oral transmission, popular culture, or general mythology textbooks).
His grandmother also owned a reproduction of Velazquez’s painting Las hilanderas, 99 which
depicts Minerva and Arachne peacefully spinning wool in the foreground and the weaving
competition in a tapestry in the background. This is an intermediate point of contact between
Ovid and Dawe, a brief resurfacing of the mythic river. Although he denies a conscious influence
from the story, the Arachne myth is present in Dawe’s subconscious; it is therefore possible for it
to manifest in his art.
In examining the paratexts around Dawe’s art, other connections with the Arachne myth
become apparent. Dawe works in textiles in order “to examine the complicated construction of
98
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gender and identity in his native Mexico and . . . to subvert the notions of masculinity and
machismo prevalent in the present day.” 100 When asked about the motivation behind his art, he
frequently cites a childhood memory with his grandmother: “He remembers being ridiculed for
wanting to embroider like his grandmother, who held fast to her cultural belief that sewing was
for girls, not boys. She taught his sister to embroider, but not him.” 101 The same person who
owned the Velazquez painting of the Arachne story and likely told Dawe the myth forbade him
from embroidery and the similarly feminine art of weaving.
The story of Arachne and Minerva plays out in the paratext (and by extension in the
Plexus weaving sculptures). The grandmother, like Minerva, holds the power of weaving. While
Minerva, disguised as an old woman, insists that Arachne acknowledge her as her teacher,
Dawe’s grandmother refuses to teach him embroidery at all. Arachne’s weaving becomes a
challenge to the gods, just as Dawe’s weaving sculpture defies the patriarchal taboos his
grandmother embodied. Dawe competes, in a sense, with his grandmother and her worldviews,
and his weaving is the means of his challenge. While Ovid’s story plays out the competition
between the divine and the mortal, Dawe’s work shifts the conflict between machismo and
“feminine” masculinity. The undeniable beauty of the Plexus sculptures parallels the undeniable
skill of Arachne’s tapestry; while the established competitor exhibits unquestioned strength, the
challenger proffers undeniable value. By examining how the Arachne myth flows into Dawe’s
work, we can see how the themes of vibrant depictions of weaving lead to the theme of
challenging established orders. As Sanders notes, “the reader who approaches the . . . [text] with
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an active sense of the subtextual depth provided by the . . . myth has the opportunity for
additional production of meaning(s), which can only enrich an experience of the narrative.” 102

Textile

The third metaphor to describe intertextual relations serves as a caution and an explanation of
their limitations in identifying classical sources. Texts are like “a tissue, a woven fabric.” 103 Each
source material is a thread, and the author creates the pattern that combines many source threads
into a new tapestry. As Kristeva explains with a related metaphor, “Any text is constructed as a
mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another.” 104 However, this
process of weaving destroys the source (the thread) as an entity of self-contained, individual
meaning; it is lost in the larger design of the new text (the tapestry). This means that any attempt
to isolate an individual mythic source in the larger text is like pulling on a single thread and
unraveling the tapestry. Intertextual interpretations, while still useful, are inevitably distortions of
the text.
This is due to Kristeva’s concept of transposition, which is “the passage from one sign
system to another . . . an altering of the thetic position—the destruction of the old position and
the formation of a new one.” 105 The context around the old mythic pattern is “destroyed” to
make room for a new context; in Sophocles’ Ajax, for example, Ajax slaughters sheep in a bout
of insanity within the context of the Trojan War and the myth is enmeshed in a complex network
of related stories. Here the madness is a mark of shame that leads to Ajax’s suicide, a divine
Sanders, Adaptation and Appropriation, 99.
Roland Barthes, Image, Music, Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Noonday Press, 1977), 159.
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curse that lays a great warrior low. But when the myth is recontextualized to form the narrative
of Don Quixote insanely slaughtering sheep, the larger Greek context is destroyed to allow for
the new context of the seventeenth-century Spanish countryside and literature. Now the madness
takes on a comedic tone; Don Quixote never was a great warrior, nor does the reader know him
outside the context of his insanity. What’s more, he loses to the shepherds who defend their
sheep, a parody of the Ajax story to the point of bathos. The myth’s transposition into a new
surrounding context inevitably changes the meaning. The same thread is used in both tapestries,
but the threads around it are what give it its meaning, not an essential meaning in the thread/myth
itself.
The key to intertextuality is that a text is the combination of many texts, and that “in the
space of a given text, several utterances, taken from other texts, intersect and neutralize one
another.” 106 Meaning is therefore not created from the combined meaning of many texts, but
rather the annulment of their meanings; a new text “admits the existence of an other (discourse)
only to the extent that it makes it its own.” 107 Like destructive sound waves, meanings of source
texts are cancelled out as they meet each other within the space of the new text. Kristeva’s
concept of binary themes negating one another can be extended to the larger question of how
many intertextual sources negate, and thereby create, meaning:
The negation remains incomplete and unfinished unless it includes this doubly negative
movement that reduces the difference between two terms to a radical disjunction with
permutation of those terms; that is, to an empty space around which they move, dying out
as entities and turning into an alternating rhythm. 108
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Yet understanding how a myth operates as a source requires the critic to understand the myth’s
former meaning in order to compare it to the new text. The myth was meant to be in the
background, but the critic’s identification of the myth undoes the negation, highlighting the
mythic thread above the other source threads and artificially bringing it to the fore of the story.
Like the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, a myth cannot be observed as a source without
altering the meaning of the overall text. 109 For this reason Roland Barthes cautions against using
intertextuality as a means of finding sources:
The intertextual in which every text is held, it itself being the text-between of another
text, is not to be confused with some origin of the text: to try to find the ‘sources’, the
‘influences’ of a work, is to fall in with the myth of filiation; the citations which go to
make up a text are anonymous, untraceable, and yet already read: they are quotations
without inverted commas. 110
The “myth of filiation” is a direct challenge to the earlier genetic model of intertextuality. I
contend that using intertextual assumptions is still a valid method to identify the influence of
classical myth, but Barthes’ argument should give the scholar pause. To read with the sources
functioning at a subconscious level is a different experience than when a source or sources are
made apparent. Ultimately it is the choice of the reader that governs the way in which the text is
read, and whether it is more enjoyable to trace the individual threads or to observe the larger
pattern into which the threads disappear. A skilled critic should be able to alternate between the
two modes of analysis.
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Intertextual analyses are also strengthened when not only the mythic threads are
considered, but as many of the source threads as possible. As Sanders notes, “Perhaps it will
increasingly serve us better to think in terms of complex filtration, and in terms of networks,
webs and signifying fields, rather than simplistic one-way lines of movement from source to
adaptation.” 111 The new context of a myth is more important than any intrinsic meaning it might
have had in an ancient context, as any such “original” meaning will not survive contact with
multiple intertextual sources without radical transformation.

Example: Dionysian Intertexts in Unamuno’s San Manuel Bueno, mártir

As discussed in the previous chapter, Miguel de Unamuno knows how to weave named
mythic allusions into his works. But as a classicist, his work bears mnestic traces of classical
mythology even when such traces are not overt. His novella San Manuel Bueno, mártir (1930),
for example, draws on Dionysian intertexts, both from Euripides’ Bacchae and Friedrich
Nietzsche’s Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik (1872). It is clear from his other
works that Unamuno had read both texts carefully before he authored San Manuel, and he could
have drawn on them consciously or unconsciously while writing. Yet because he does not give
any overt indication that don Manuel is a Dionysus figure (as would be the case in an adaptation
or allusion), an intertextual approach best analyzes how these earlier texts influence meaning in
San Manuel.
The story follows don Manuel, the kindly village priest who holds a terrible secret: he
does not believe in the afterlife. He feigns belief for the sake of the simple-minded villagers, but
initiates a brother and sister into his doubts, forming a new brand of existential Christianity. The
111
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story contains thematic echoes of introducing a new religion (Euripides) as well as the creative
tension between order and chaos (Nietzsche). These intertexts emphasize don Manuel’s
superabundant life as well as his hyperawareness of death, a Dionysian contradiction that the
priest comes to embody.
As the reader moves upstream in intertextual influences, he first encounters Nietzsche’s
interpretation and reworking of the Dionysus myth. Unamuno was not only well acquainted with
Nietzsche’s work, but Nietzschean philosophy often crept into his own writings. On the whole,
Unamuno disagreed with Nietzsche’s concepts of the afterlife, yet he returned to them as an
unexorcised fear of the dissolution of self after death. For example, when Nietzsche suggests that
humans obtain immortality through the recycling of the body’s atoms after death, Unamuno
rejects the notion because he believes immortality is the continuation of the self or mind. 112 In
many ways, Nietzsche’s ideas came to represent Unamuno’s own crises of faith when he doubted
such a continuation, and the battle with the long-dead philosopher became an introspective
one. 113 In 1913, Unamuno wrote Del sentimiento trágico de la vida en los hombres y en los
pueblos, which, as the title implies, is a reworking of Nietzsche’s ideas of the Apollonian and the
Dionysian, couched in terms of the conflict between reason and faith. Here he explains the
history of Greek religion as a movement away from nature worship to “la religión más espiritual
de Apolo, la de la redención” [the more spiritual religion of Apollo, that of redemption]. 114 His
use of “redención” in particular has Christian overtones. However, not content with such a
religion, “los primeros filósofos griegos afirmaron la inmortalidad por contradicción . . .
Unamuno, Del sentimiento trágico de la vida (New York: Las Americas Publishing Company, 1964), 93. This
makes Francisco La Rubia Prado’s brief reading of don Manuel as an eternally cyclical Dionysus problematic,
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asentando un dogma dionisíaco y órfico, no apolíneo” 115 [the first Greek philosophers affirmed
immortality by contradiction... establishing a Dionysian and Orphic dogma, not an Apollonian
one]. In San Manuel, the protagonist plays out his author’s inner turmoil, making Nietzsche’s
texts an important intertext for understanding the character’s struggle. Both author and character
suffer from an acute awareness of absolute death, which drives them to impassioned life (the
Dionysian), but they represent such incommunicable, existential secrets through the image of
Christianity (the Apollonian).
Unamuno derives these concepts from Nietzsche’s definition of the Dionysiac artist as
“gänzlich mit dem Ur-Einen, seinem Schmerz und Widerspruch” 116 [“one with the primordial
unity, with its pain and contradiction”]. 117 Dionysian men
haben einmal einen wahren Blick in das Wesen der Dinge getan, sie haben erkannt, und
es ekelt sie zu handeln; denn ihre Handlung kann nichts am ewigen Wesen der Dinge
ändern . . . nicht das Reflektieren, nein! – die wahre Erkenntnis, der Einblick in die
grauenhafte Wahrheit überwiegt jedes zum Handeln antreibende Motiv . . . die Sehnsucht
geht über eine Welt nach dem Tode, über die Götter selbst hinaus, das Dasein wird, samt
seiner gleißenden Wiederspiegelung in den Göttern oder in einem unsterblichen Jenseits,
verneint. In der Bewußtheit der einmal geschauten Wahrheit sieht jetzt der Mensch
überall nur das Entsetzliche oder Absurde des Seins. 118
[have gazed into the true essence of things, they have acquired knowledge and they find
action repulsive, for their actions can do nothing to change the eternal essence of things .
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. . No, it is not reflection, it is true knowledge, insight into a terrible truth, which
outweighs every motive for action . . . There is a longing for a world beyond death,
beyond the gods themselves; existence is denied, along with its treacherous reflection in
the gods or in some immortal Beyond. Once truth has been seen, the consciousness of it
prompts man to see only what is terrible or absurd in existence wherever he looks]. 119
Upon realizing that the ordered universe is a lie that covers the underlying chaos, most Dionysian
people lose all sense of purpose. They gaze into the existential abyss and realize that all action is
impotent, for there is no larger organization to give context and meaning. Walter Otto, who
wrote his Dionysos, Mythos und Kultus (1833) only three years after San Manuel was published,
crystalizes the Nietzschean thoughts of the time:
Die vertraute Welt, in der die Menschen sich so sicher und behaglich eingerichtet haben,
sie ist nicht mehr! Das Tosen der Dionsichen Ankunft hat sie hinweggefegt. . . Die
Urwelt ist hervorgetreten, die Tiefen des Seins haben sich geöffnet. . . Bild der
wohlgeordneten Gewohnheitswelt zersprengt. Sie bringen keinen Trug und Traum, sie
bringen die Wahrheit – eiene Wahrheit, die Wahnsinnig macht. 120
[The world man knows, the world in which he has settled himself so securely and snugly
–that world is no more. The turbulence which accompanied the arrival of Dionysus has
swept it away . . . .The primeval world has stepped into the foreground, the depths of
reality have been opened . . . .The innocent picture of a well-ordered routine world has
been shattered by their coming, and they bring with them no illusions or fantasies but
truth – a truth that brings on madness]. 121
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Unamuno had a similar experience in 1897, when the well-ordered creeds and worldview of
Christianity were swept away at the fear of a meaningless passing into nothing after death. 122
This crisis of faith nearly broke him, and he would return to this uncertainty of the afterlife many
times in his life thereafter.
Don Manuel too is a Dionysian man and suffers from the same pain and attraction to the
void. He no longer believes in an afterlife, which makes his devotion to Christianity an absurdity.
Without the hope of a resurrection, all that lies beyond death is the emptiness that so terrified
Unamuno. When his follower Lázaro asks him why he doesn’t share the existential truth with his
congregation, don Manuel replies “¿La verdad? La verdad, Lázaro, acaso es algo terrible, algo
intolerable, algo mortal; la gente sencilla no podría vivir con ella.” 123 [The truth? The truth,
Lázaro, is perhaps something terrible, something intolerable, something deadly; simple people
could not live with it]. This description of truth is the same as Nietzsche’s, where the Spanish
adjective terrible equates to the German grauenhafte. Don Manuel is one of those who “haben
erkannt,” as Nietzsche described, and now must live with the unbearable knowledge of what
Unamuno called the pagan fear of nothing. 124 It is the awareness that consciousness, and
therefore the self, will die with the body. There is no sense of order in the universe beyond
mortality, only chaos that will deny context and therefore existence to the individual after life.
And yet while don Manuel fears the void that awaits him after death, he is maddeningly
drawn towards it. He often goes to the lake and contemplates his suicide, saying
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¡Y cómo me llama esa agua con su aparente quietud! . . . Mi vida, Lázaro, es una especie
de suicidio continuo, un combate contra el suicidio, que es igual.” 125
[And how that water calls me with its apparent calm! . . . My life, Lazarus, is a kind of
continuous suicide, a battle against suicide, which is the same].
Suicide into an empty void is, of course, the ultimate inaction of which Nietzsche speaks. What
Unamuno describes as the water calling him with its calm is Nietzsche’s “Sehnsucht” (longing)
for a world beyond death, where existence itself is denied. Don Manuel has encountered the
Dionysian truth, and it torments him.
However, the Dionysian abyss is also the wellspring of life and creativity, to which
Nietzsche ascribes the inspiration of all artistic endeavors: “die Kunst: sie allein vermag jene
Ekelgedanken über das Entsetzliche oder Absurde des Daseins in Vorstellungen umzubiegen, mit
denen sich leben läßt” 126 [“Art alone can re-direct those repulsive thoughts about the terrible or
absurd nature of existence into representations with which man can live”]. 127 In many ways, don
Manuel’s obras in service to the town become an obra de teatro; his entire life is one continuous
act of Apollonian expression of his Dionysian pain. Through that artistic expression the infinite
horrors of the Dionysian become bearable, compressed into a single image of the devout
Christian priest serving his parishioners. As Nietzsche explains:
So entreißt uns das Apollinische der dionysischen Allgemeinheit und entzückt uns für die
Individuen; an diese fesselt es unsre Mitleidserregung . . . es führt an uns Lebensbilder
vorbei und reizt uns zu gedankenhaftem Erfassen des in ihnen enthaltenen Lebenskernes.
Mit der ungeheuren Wuscht des Bildes, des Begriffs, der ethischen Lehre, der
sympathischen Erregung reißt das Apollinische den Menschen aus seiner orgiastischen
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Selbstvernichtung empor und täuscht ihn über die Allgemeinheit des dionysischen
Vorganges hinweg zu dem Wahne, daß er ein einzelnes Weltbild . . . sehe. 128
[Thus the Apolline tears us away from Dionysiac generality and causes us to take delight
in individuals; it attaches the compassion which has been awakened in us to these
individuals . . . it parades images of life before our eyes and stimulates us to comprehend
in thought the core of life contained within them. With the enormous force of image,
concept, ethical doctrine and sympathetic excitement, the Apolline wrenches man out of
his orgiastic self-destruction, deceives him about the generality of the Dionysiac event,
and induces in him the delusion that he is seeing a single image of the world].129
The individuals Nietzsche discusses here are characters in plays or other artistic images, but
Unamuno transforms them into the villagers don Manuel serves. The existential crisis awakens in
him a compassion for his parishioners, and the core of life in each of them becomes most
valuable to him. For this reason the death of children and suicides pain him so greatly, for they
shatter the image of life he builds. 130 Don Manuel attempts to escape his “orgiastischen
Selbstvernichtung” with the dream images of the Apollonian and to keep his followers in the
strictly coherent Apollonian world. Not only his charitable works, but also the dogma of
Christianity present a well-ordered universe where the good are rewarded in an afterlife. But he
himself is unable to escape the Dionysian truths that seethe within him, as he explains to Lázaro:
Démosle opio, y que duerma y que sueñe. Yo mismo, con esta mi loca actividad, me
estoy administrando opio. Y no logro dormir bien, y menos soñar bien . . . ¡Esta terrible
pesadilla! 131
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[Let us give them opium, and let them sleep and dream. I myself, with this my crazy
activity, am administering opium to myself. And I do not succeed at sleeping well, and
less at dreaming well . . . This terrible nightmare!]
Dreams are an expression of the Apollonian, images that the brain creates to interpret and cover
the subconscious. 132 Yet the painful knowledge of awakened reality cannot be unlearned, and
don Manuel cannot fully escape into the ordered images of the universe he creates.
The shift from a purely artistic expression to one of physical labor in Unamuno’s work is
not surprising; elsewhere he said, “de este abismo de desesperación puede surgir esperanza, y
cómo puede ser fuente de acción y de labor humana, hondamente humana, y de solidaridad y
hasta de progreso.” 133 [From this abyss of hopelessness, hope can rise, and how it can be a
source of action and human labor, profoundly human, and of solidarity and even of progress].
Don Manuel’s humanitarian work is then but one more expression of the Dionysian abyss, which
would otherwise be unintelligible to the villagers.
While don Manuel ultimately succeeds at shielding his parishioners from the brunt of the
Dionysian abyss, he is able to communicate its life-bringing essence to them. The fullness of the
Dionysian can only be experienced directly, and its power is incommunicable except to those
who have already had a direct experience with the god. Thus Nietzsche writes “der
dithyrambische Dionysusdiener wird somit nur von seinesgleichen verstanden!” 134 [the
dithyrambic servant of Dionysos can only be understood by his own kind!] 135 However, a
portion of the Dionysian can be expressed through an Apollonian image. Unamuno asserts as
much when he says,
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Lo absoluto, lo irrevocablemente irracional e inexpresable, es intransmisible . . . cuando
algo que parece irracional o absurdo logra uno expresarlo y que se lo entiendan, se
resuelve en algo racional siempre, aunque sea en la negación de lo que se afirma.” 136
[The absolute, the irrevocably irrational and inexpressible, is intransmittable . . . when
someone succeeds at expressing something which seems irrational or absurd and they are
understood, it always resolves into something rational, although it be the negation of
what is affirmed].
Likewise, when Lázaro asks his sister to keep the villagers from learning don Manuel’s secret,
Ángela replies,
Si intentase, por locura, explicárselo, no lo entenderían. El pueblo no entiende de
palabras; el pueblo no ha entendido más que vuestras obras. Querer exponerles eso sería
como leer a unos niños de ocho años unas páginas de Santo Tomás de Aquino . . . en
latín. 137
[If I, moved by some madness, tried to explain it to them, they wouldn’t understand it.
The town doesn’t understand words; the town doesn’t understand more than your works.
Trying to explain that would be like reading some pages of Saint Thomas Aquinas to
some eight-year-old children . . . in Latin].
The villagers respond to the Apollonian representations of don Manuel’s charitable acts and
Christian teachings, but are incapable of understanding their source: the Dionysian existential
abyss.

136
137

Unamuno, Sentimiento trágico, 116.
Unamuno, San Manuel, 162–163.

64

Beyond don Manuel’s charitable acts, Catholicism itself becomes an Apollonian image to
mask and channel the Dionysian. For Unamuno, true faith was irrational and incomprehensible,
yet extremely personal. Once someone holds a mental concept of divinity, God dies for that man:
Definir algo es idealizarlo, para lo cual hay que prescindir de su elemento
inconmensurable o irracional, de su fondo vital. Y el Dios sentido, la divinidad sentida
como persona y conciencia única fuera de nosotros, aunque envolviéndonos y
sosteniéndonos, se convirtió en la idea de Dios, . . . algo muerto. 138
[To define something is to idealize it; in order to do this one must dispense with its
incommensurate or irrational element, with its vital depth. And the God who is felt, the
divinity felt like a person and like the only consciousness outside of ourselves, although
enveloping and sustaining us, was changed into the idea of God, . . . something dead].
Otto likewise disdains any concept of religion that reduces divinity to “nicht anderes als tote
Begriffe” 139 [“nothing but lifeless ideas”], 140 echoing Tersteegen’s axiom, “Ein begriffener Gott
ist kein Gott” 141 [An understood god is no god]. Christianity, with its creeds and dogmas that
give order and purpose to the universe and human life, are antithetical to the sublime experience
of the Dionysian, which must be experienced directly and personally even as it destroys those it
influences. And yet Unamuno acknowledges that “La fe pura, libre de dogmas . . . es un
fantasma . . . La fe necesita una materia en que ejercerse.” 142 [Pure faith, free of dogmas . . . is a
ghost . . . Faith needs a material upon which to exercise itself]. All experiences, even the
Dionysian, require context for the human mind to register them. Christianity allows don Manuel
to channel his experiences into a comprehensible image without which he would be left
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completely mad. However, the Apollonian Christian concept of an afterlife cannot fully capture
the Dionysian experience of nothingness after death, and the discrepancy takes a mental and
physical toll on don Manuel.
In fact, the novella itself is an artistic expression of Unamuno’s ongoing battle between
faith and reason. At the end of the story, Unamuno himself begins to speak and alludes to
Augusto Pérez in Niebla. This strengthens the relationship between don Manuel and Unamuno,
indicating that don Manuel is not merely wearing the mask of Christianity for this followers, but
embodies Unamuno’s mask, his own Apollonian expression of inner turmoil.
However, don Manuel cannot contain the creative abyss of the Dionysian without
consequence, and eventually it wears out his body. Not only must he endure the tension between
his own Dionysian experience and the Apollonian illusion of belief, but the Dionysian elements
themselves are in conflict with one another. Unamuno himself seems to have come to terms with
the eternal conflict of the rational world and irrational faith, and even desires that it continue as a
source of authentic life. 143 Yet for don Manuel the conflict brings only resignation. The certain
knowledge of death brings about a frenetic superabundance of life, and unbelief, a saintly piety.
But the contradictions are more than a mortal can bear:
The divinity of Dionysus is recognized in his superhuman ability to embody opposite
qualities simultaneously. By the same token, the popular qualities that constitute the god
also destroy his human followers, who cannot sustain the full force of both of the god’s
sides at once. 144
The very Dionysian qualities that make don Manuel remarkable also bring about his demise.
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The mountain and lake of Valverde de Lucerna also take on Nietzschean roles, and the
geographical locations are in turn woven into don Manuel’s character. Both the lake and the
mountain are used to describe don Manuel on many occasions, 145 becoming a type of leitmotif
146

that establishes the priest as a fixture of the town and part of its psyche. The lake itself is tied

to Dionysus as a further embodiment of his contradictory nature:
Das Wasser ist für den mythischen Sinn das Element, in dem die Urgeheimnisse alles
Lebens wohnen. Geburt und Tod, Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft schlingen hier
ihren Reigen . . . Belebung, Erfrischung und Ernährung ergießen sich mit den Wassern
durch die ganze Schöpfung . . . Das ist das Element, in dem Dionysos zu Hause ist. 147
[“To the mythopoeic mind, water is the element in which the primal mysteries of all life
dwell. Birth and death, past, present, and future intertwine their dances here . . . With
water come vitality, re-invigoration, and nourishment to flood through all creation . . .
Water is, then, the element in which Dionysus is at home”]. 148
The water’s depths are also one more symbol of the abyss, with its sorrow and promise of death,
and don Manuel’s connection with the lake shows his preoccupation with Dionysian themes.
In the novella, the lake is a place of death that paradoxically brings life. The deceased
ancestors of the village are said to reside in the waters, 149 and both don Manuel and Lázaro are
drawn to suicide while contemplating it. 150 Don Manuel is especially connected to it: the sadness
in his eyes is like the depth of the lake and the village of the dead also lives within his soul.151
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The Dionysian abyss is again represented in the soundless depths of the water. It is a place of
stagnation, but also the wellspring of life:
Aquí se remansa el río en lago, para luego, bajando a la meseta, precipitarse en cascadas,
saltos y torrenteras, por las hoces y encañadas, junto a la ciudad, y así remansa la vida,
aquí en la aldea. 152
[Here the river slows into the lake, so that later, flowing down to the plateau, it rushes
into cascades, falls, and torrents, through the ravines and gorges, next to the city, and thus
life stagnates, here in the village].
Although it is unmoving, the lake gives birth to flowing waters, and don Manuel does the
same; although he is a continual suicide since his experience with the Dionysian, he brings life to
his parishioners. During this parable, don Manuel directs Lázaro’s attention to “el remanso que
espeja la noche de estrellas” 153 [the stillness which reflects the night of stars]. It is difficult to
find a better representation of the Dionysian depths, veiled with an image of the ordered
Apollonian universe, than the lake reflecting the image of the stars.
Not only does Unamuno draw heavily from Nietzsche’s philosophical uses of the
Dionysus myth, but he also incorporates many elements directly from the classical source which
lies farther upstream in the Western tradition. Unamuno weaves thematic and iconographic
elements from Euripides’ Bacchae into his narrative to highlight how don Manuel embodies
Dionysian characteristics of ecstatic dance, soothing wine, and representational theater.
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Most often scholars allude to Dionysus in order to prove that San Manuel belongs to the
tragic tradition. 154 While the mode may be tragic, the kind (or genre form) is much closer to
gospel writings. 155 Ángela, as her name implies, serves as the messenger and evangelist for a
new form of Christianity that masks a Dionysian intensity. The second section of the novella
especially resembles a gospel in that it is written in pericopes, of which the arrangement and
relation is significant. Don Manuel exhibits Dionysian characteristics in three consecutive
pericopes at the center of this section, denoting a purposeful highlighting of the priest’s devotion
to engendering abundant life.
In the first of these pericopes, don Manuel incites the village youth to dance.
Solía ir al baile. Y más de una vez se puso en él a tocar el tamboril para que los mozos y
las mozas bailasen, y esto, que en otro hubiera parecido grotesca profanación del
sacerdocio, en él tomaba un sagrado carácter y como de rito religioso. 156
[He was accustomed to go to dances. And more than once he was moved to play the
small drum so that the young men and women dance, and this, which in another would
have seemed a grotesque profanation of the priesthood, in him took on a sacred character
and was like a religious rite].
While song and procession are a part of Catholic worship, dancing would be considered too
secular for a priest to encourage. 157 However, dance is an essential part of Dionysian worship.
Every tragedy in ancient Greece would have a dancing chorus, and reveling dances were part of
maenad devotion. Don Manuel here takes up the drum himself to inspire the Bacchic rite.
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Frenzied dancing serves the same purpose as wine: it draws all the participant’s attention to the
present, to a hyperawareness of one’s own body, and the adrenaline also intoxicates. Yet don
Manuel here plays a dangerous game. One the one hand, ritual frenzy can induce an out-of-body
experience, a contact with the god of undiluted life who gives humans the hope of
immortality. 158 On the other, this same god rules the abyss that torments the priest with its
promise of eternal extinction. Perhaps this is why don Manuel tempers the dance with a prayer
before it can go too far, once again casting an Apollonian veil over what he does not wish his
followers to see.
The pericope immediately following has don Manuel wishing to turn the entire lake into
wine:
En una boda dijo una vez: “¡Ay, si pudiese cambiar el agua toda de nuestro lago en vino,
en un vinillo que por mucho que de él se bebiera alegrara siempre, sin emborrachar nunca
. . . o por lo menos con una borrachera alegre!” 159
[He once said at a wedding: “Oh, would that I could change all the water of our lake into
wine, into a little wine that, no matter how much of it one should drink, it would always
gladden, without ever making drunk . . . or at least with a glad drunkenness”].
The reference to John 2:1–5 is obvious, where Jesus too turns water into wine at a wedding, but
the reference to drunkenness is not biblical. Furthermore, Jesus pressed for greater enlightenment
and control, an Apollonian sentiment, while don Manuel wishes to obfuscate through joyful
intoxication. Here he is much closer to Euripides’ Dionysus as a god of wine, who in Euripides’
words can also bring forth the drink spontaneously when asked by his followers: “ἄλλη δὲ
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νάρθηκ᾿ ἐς πέδον καθῆκε γῆς / καὶ τῇδε κρήνην ἐξανῆκ᾿ οἴνου θεός” 160 [Another woman placed
a fennel into the ground, / and from the earth the God brought forth a spring of wine]. Wine can
likewise bring a surcease of sorrow for the laboring class, another goal that both Dionysus and
don Manuel share:
...ὃ παύει τοὺς ταλαιπώρους βροτοὺς
λύπης, ὅταν πλησθῶσιν ἀμπέλου ῥοῆς,
ὕπνον τε λήθην τῶν καθ᾿ ἡμέραν κακῶν
δίδωσιν, οὐδ᾿ ἔστ᾿ ἄλλο φάρμακον πόνων.
[which thing gives rest to suffering mortals from pain, whenever they are filled with the
juice of the vine, and gives sleep and a forgetting of daily evils, neither is there another
cure for work]. 161
This pleasant drunkenness masks the darker side of the god, forcing the imbiber to forget his
troubles. While don Manuel wishes to shield the villagers from the Nietzschean existential dread
of Dionysian madness through the Apollonian religion of Christianity, he is not above using the
wine god’s power to further dull their sensitivity.
The third pericope shows don Manuel’s mastery of Dionysus’ domain of theater. A poor
clown and his family come to the village, and while he is putting on a show, his wife dies. Don
Manuel helps her in her passing, and afterwards the clown calls don Manuel a saint. The priest
responds,
El santo eres tú, honrado payaso; te vi trabajar, y comprendí que no sólo lo haces para dar
pan a tus hijos, sino también para dar alegría a los de los otros. 162
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[You are the saint, honored clown. I saw you work, and I understood that you not only do
it to give your children bread, but also to give happiness to the children of others].
This ability to gladden others is consistent with Dionysian traits: “In the eyes of the ordinary
people . . . the Hellenistic Dionysos was first of all a savior god, a liberator from depression on
earth and from suffering in the hereafter.” 163 Of course, don Manuel himself is a kind of clown
who entertains the entire village while he remains dead inside. This final pericope serves as the
climax of the set, preparing the reader for the discovery that don Manuel has been feigning belief
all along.
Don Manuel’s interactions with Lázaro closely mirror those of Dionysus and his initial
followers in the Bacchae, where both parties, reluctant to engage in the irrational worship, are
drawn in through the priest’s irresistible power.
Lázaro is the only educated man in the village, having studied abroad in America. He is
an atheist and a communist, filled with progressive ideas of how to liberate people from religion
and feudalism. He returns to Valverde to find the entire town ensorcelled by don Manuel’s
vivaciousness. At first he is hostile towards the priest, insisting that “los curas manejan a las
mujeres y las mujeres a los hombres” 164 [the priests control the women and the women control
the men]. Here he first parallels Euripides’ Bacchae, where Pentheus complains of Dionysus’
unique control over the women of his city. But soon he is consumed by curiosity to see don
Manuel preach: “Lázaro, por su parte, ardía en deseos – me lo dijo luego – de ir a oír a don
Manuel, de verle y oírle en la iglesia, de acercarse a él y con él conversar, de conocer el secreto
de aquel su imperio espiritual sobre las almas.” 165 [Lázaro, for his part, burned with desire (he
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told me later) to go to hear don Manuel, to see him and hear him in the church, to approach him
and converse with him, to learn the secret of that spiritual empire of his over souls]. This desire
to see the god’s influence over his followers directly parallels Pentheus’ sudden desire to see the
maenads. Even when repulsed by the religion, both Pentheus and Lázaro are drawn to the strange
power the god exerts. It is once again the Dionysian irrationality calling to one who has the
potential to experience it without the Apollonian veil of Christianity.
Significantly, Lázaro’s conversion to the Dionysian abyss does not occur in the church or
town, but out by the lake and mountains, where Dionysian worship has always occurred. “Íbanse
por las tardes de paseo, orilla del lago, o hacia las ruinas, vestidas de hiedra, de la vieja abadía de
cistercienses.” 166 [They went on walks in the evenings, along the shore of the lake, or toward the
ruins, dressed with ivy, of the old abbey of the Cistercians]. The lake as a Dionysian symbol has
already been discussed; the ivy-covered ruins, where Lázaro receives most of his instruction, 167
represents a cluster of themes. It is the ruin of a religious order, and it is here that don Manuel
will shatter the religious veil over the Dionysian abyss. It is the equivalent to Semele’s tomb,
which Bacchus covers in ivy upon his return to Thebes. The god calls it σηκόν, 168 a sacred place
worthy of worship. The phrase “vestidas de hiedra” is even set off in a parenthetical phrase,
placing extra emphasis on this Dionysian detail. So these ruins, covered in a plant sacred to
Dionysus, become a holy place where Lázaro first sees the life/death contradiction of the
Dionysian. He later takes communion before the entire village in an Apollonian illusion, but his
true conversion occurs in an unmistakably Dionysian setting.
Lázaro at first objects to don Manuel’s deception, but soon realizes that the priest is
correct. The way to bring the villagers happiness is to deceive them into believing Christianity,
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lest they encounter the dread of the existential abyss. This “engaño” 169 [deception] is equivalent
to the κατάψευσις καλὴ [beautiful lie] that Cadmus suggests to Pentheus:
κεἰ μὴ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς οὗτος, ὡς σὺ φῄς,
παρὰ σοὶ λεγέσθω· καὶ καταψεύδου καλῶς
ὡς ἔστι 170
[Even if this god does not exist, as you assert, allow him to be spoken of in your
presence; and lie beautifully that he exists].
The beautiful lie, written two millennia earlier as a minor line in the Bacchae, is the centerpiece
of Unamuno’s novel. Don Manuel lies about the existence of the Christian afterlife for the
benefit of his parishioners because he knows the lie is more useful than the truth.
Pentheus’ conversion ends with his death, dressed in full maenad regalia and completely
at the god’s mercy. Lázaro likewise dies symbolically upon his conversion. After explaining his
own continuous suicide by maintaining an Apollonian façade over the Dionysian emptiness, don
Manuel orders, “Sigamos, pues, Lázaro, suicidándonos en nuestra obra y en nuestro pueblo” 171
[Let us continue, then, Lázaro, to kill ourselves in our work and our town]. After don Manuel’s
physical death, Lázaro experiences the same enervation from the impossibility of containing the
Dionysian opposites of life and death while maintaining the Apollonian illusion, and follows the
priest into the void of literal death when his body gives out from exhaustion.
Unamuno uses the Pentheus story to illustrate the transmission of the Dionysian religion,
which is always a violent affair. On the surface, both characters want to stop the spread of
religion: Pentheus wants to halt the spread of Dionysian worship, while Lázaro threatens to
inculcate the villagers with atheism. Neither one understands the nature of the religion he
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opposes and how such religion is essential to life. Both Dionysus and don Manuel worship the
life/death dichotomy; but, while Euripides’ Dionysus wants everyone to directly experience its
wonders and horrors, don Manuel seeks to control its expression through the Apollonian. In the
former case, Pentheus attempts to stem the dichotomy, while in the latter Lázaro threatens to
unwittingly unleash it upon all the villagers. Don Manuel decides that the only way to stop
Lázaro is to tear away the illusion and show him the full extent of the Dionysian void, what
Nietzsche describes as “das ungeheure Grausen, . . . welches den Menschen ergreift, wenn er
plözlich an den Erkenntnisformen der Erscheinung irre wird” 172 [“the enormous horror which
seizes people when they suddenly . . . lose faith in the cognitive forms of the phenomenal
world”]. 173 The priest thus converts him to the Dionysian dichotomy of life and death and
metaphorically kills him in the process. Once don Manuel, Lázaro, and—eventually—Ángela
die, the villagers are left in the Apollonian world, with the beatified San Manuel to continue the
illusion. There remains the possibility, though, that someone will once again break through the
veil and face the terrifying contradiction of Dionysian death and life.
Readings of San Manuel Bueno, mártir are enriched when the reader looks to both
Nietzsche and Euripides for intertextual understanding. Nietzsche’s philosophy sheds light on the
source of don Manuel’s motivations for playing the part of a priest when he no longer believes in
an afterlife. His awareness of the Dionysian void of death grants him a superabundance of life,
and the Catholic creeds allow his existential knowledge an Apollonian expression for his
parishioners. Three of the more troubling pericopes that comprise the narrative take on new
significance as aspects of Dionysian worship. Don Manuel is no longer an eccentric priest who
condones drunkenness, dancing, and theater, but a Dionysian priest who knows how such
172
173

Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie, 24.
Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 17.

75

activities engender a fuller life. And Lázaro’s passionate conversion to don Manuel’s cause can
be traced back to Euripides’ Pentheus; he is compelled to acknowledge the power of the
Dionysian contradiction of life and death. Overall, an account of the novella’s classical intertexts
greatly enriches its interpretation.
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Chapter 4: Reception
The methods discussed thus far have assumed a historical basis for the connection
between myth and usage, that it was the author’s intention to draw on classical myth (adaptation)
or that he subconsciously or unwittingly acted as a transmitter of the classical tradition
(intertextuality). Reader response theory, by contrast, assumes that “meaning . . . is always
realized at the point of reception.” 174 It is the reader who receives the work and must interpret it,
thus shifting focus away from authorial intent, considering “each moment of transmission as
involving complex transformations, resulting in a plurality of ‘traditions’.” 175 With no single
correct interpretation of a myth or its receiving text, scholars are able to explore more
possibilities in meaning. And like intertextuality, reception does not require the text to name its
connection to classical myth. Instead the scholar as reader can make this connection in the
analysis.
Reception assumes that the author and reader create meaning together, their interaction
mediated through the text. While the text places limits on feasible interpretations, it is not so
restrictive that only one reading is possible. Instead the reader brings to the text a “horizon of
expectations” determined by what texts he has read before and by his own life experiences. It is
through this lens that a reader interprets a text, therefore every reader produces a slightly
different reading.
There are two main methods of reception criticism in Classics: the first attempts to
reconstruct an author’s reading of a classical text and how the author encoded this reading into a
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new artistic work (i.e. Dante’s reading of Vergil, as portrayed in the Comedia). This approach
has much in common with the adaptation method described in chapter one, and answers the
question, “How did an author interpret a myth while writing?” The second method allows the
critic to read a myth into a modern text; she uses the myth as an interpretive lens to create new
meaning, eliding any potential historical connection between the ancient and modern texts. This
method answers the question “How would this text appear through a classicist’s eyes?” There is
a great deal of tension between the two methods and no shortage of debate around the issue, as
Paul notes in the study of Classics in film:
The theoretical point on which this issue seems to turn is, in fact, the location – the
‘point’ – of the very process of reception . . . Do we understand ‘the point of reception’
to be located in the film’s reading of the classical past, or to be pushed back a stage into
the reader (viewer) of the film? Or is it simultaneously in both? Christopher McQuarrie
(The Usual Suspects’ scriptwriter) may not have thought of his film as a reception of
Homer, but if [the scholar] Roisman reads Homer into it, does it then constitute a
classical reception? This is a live issue for reception study in general, but it is particularly
pertinent for a number of films which, by seeming to flaunt some kind of relationship to
antiquity, lure the classicists in, only for them to find themselves tangled in a movie
whose relationship to the ancient past is characterized by a complex mix of ambiguity,
authenticity, and evasion. 176
I would argue that both methods are valid, but that a scholar should make clear which method
she is using. When she is making an argument about reception at the point of the author,
historical evidence becomes necessary because she is making a historical claim about what the
author thought during the creative process. When she is writing about reception at the point of
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the reader, historical evidence is not necessary because she is instead inviting others to look at
the modern text from a new angle (through comparison with classical myth), which highlights
new patterns and aspects of the text that would not otherwise be apparent.

Reception at Point of the Author

Understanding how an author receives a text is similar in methodology to adaptation and
represents a shift in focus rather than substance. Instead of conceptualizing two texts (the
hypertext and the hypotext) and their relationship, reception emphasizes the author as a reader
of an earlier text, and the new text as a byproduct and evidence of his reading. As Harold Bloom
states, “Let us pursue instead the quest of learning to read any poem as its poet’s deliberate
misinterpretation, as a poet, of a precursor poem or of poetry in general.” 177 This assumes that
each author/reader will have a unique interpretation of the classical myth and that a scholar
cannot assume that the ancient or “canonical” interpretation was what the author had in mind
when writing a new work. This is especially true because the standard interpretation of ancient
works shifts through time and place; Vergil’s portrayal of Aeneas’ ambitions towards empire, for
example, would have very different readings in 18th-century colonizing England and 21stcentury post-colonial South Africa.
The scholar’s task is to reconstruct the creative process and historical context which led
to the author’s interpretation of a classical myth, which was in turn re-written into a new text. As
this method is most often employed on texts where the connection to a classical myth is clearly
stated and not in question, scholars instead focus on why such a myth would have an artistic
appeal to the author at that given point in history. As Jauss explains,
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The reconstruction of the horizon of expectations, in the face of which a work was
created and received in the past, enables one . . . to pose questions that the text gave an
answer to, and thereby to discover how the contemporary reader could have viewed and
understood the work. 178
For example, Jean Anouilh chose the myth of Sophocles’ Antigone to explore the resistance of
tyranny during the Nazi occupation of France. The pressing questions of the time period become
essential to understanding the author’s interpretation of myth.
What steps can a scholar take when examining an author’s reading? Jorge Luis Borges
plays with this idea of reception theory in his fictional short story “Pierre Menard,” where an
author attempts to re-write the Quixote word for word but through his own semantic filter. His
first attempt, however, was to recreate the novel through Cervantes’ perspective: “The initial
method he conceived was relatively simple: to know Spanish well, re-embrace the Catholic faith,
to fight against Moors or the Turk, to forget European history between 1602 and 1918, and to be
Miguel de Cervantes.” 179 This is, of course, impossible to do, so the fictional Menard quickly
abandons it as paradoxically too easy and less interesting than pursuing his own reading of the
Quixote. Scholars who attempt Menard’s first method may be met with skepticism, for their task
of reconstructing the author’s reading is likewise impossible—even perfectly reconstructing
one’s own earlier reading cannot be done since the self who read the book before has since
changed. Yet impossibility has never stopped the quixotic endeavors of scholars, and while those
seeking to reconstruct an author’s reading may never achieve objective certainty, they can at
least uncover and add historical factors to the interpretive mix.
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Borges’ ironic process is in reality a good start. Scholars are capable of partially (though
not completely) compartmentalizing their information of what transpired in history after an
author wrote and using contemporary historical sources to understand the general political and
social climate of the time. Journals, letters, and essays also aid the scholar in reconstructing the
author’s opinions, which in turn can help understand why a particular myth was relevant to the
author’s new text. This reconstructed author becomes an interpretive lens to understand the
mythic usage; but as Kallendorf notes, “The recreated reader-author . . . can merge with the
author as actual reader if relevant external evidence . . . can be found.” 180 Notes scrawled in the
margins of the author’s personal copies of classical texts or his writings about the myths can
allow for a more certain understanding of the author’s usage. Beyond this, the scholar must rely
on similar methods of adaptation and allusion to understand how a myth operates in the text:
The critic, the second reader, works backwards and recreates this process as he or she is
able to understand it, reading the second text and coming to a preliminary idea about
what it means, then noticing a relationship to an earlier text that the author could have
known, then going back and forth between the two to reconstruct the author’s reading of
the first text on the basis of the allusions and what they appear to reveal. 181
While Kallendorf supports Jauss’ idea of reconstructing the author’s horizon of expectations,
Martindale has opposed it (or at least qualified it), noting that scholars are also readers and
therefore subject to the same subjective interpretations of both the ancient work and the author’s
text. He views reception as a way of escaping positivist assertions, denying that there is only one
correct interpretation of ancient texts, and warns that scholars might make the same mistaken
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assumption when examining a later author’s usage of classical myth. 182 To the extent that all
scholarship is subjective, as postmodern critics have shown, Martindale is correct. Yet
reconstructing the author’s reading (a reading of a reading) is still a valuable interpretive tool
when taken cum grano salis. While each reader brings a new interpretation to a text, the author
had his own interpretation while he was composing it. Understanding what that interpretation
was, both of the classical myth and the process of incorporating it into a new text, adds to the
collective understanding and scholarship on the text, even though later readers’ subsequent
interpretations are no less valid.

Reception at the Point of the Scholar

The second form of reception assumes that the meaning of the text is located in the
scholar’s reading of the receiving text. Rather than objectively uncovering a historical meaning
from the author’s reading or analyzing the text exegetically, the scholar can instead create
meaning with equal value to the author’s original intent. As Bloom has noted: “There are no
interpretations but only misinterpretations, and so all criticism is prose poetry.” 183 Barthes
likewise states, “There are no more critics, only writers.” 184 A scholarly essay is therefore merely
one more step in the creative process that shapes meaning, as inventive as the text it analyzes.
When scholars are no longer conceptualized as commentators, but as authors in their own
right, they are just as influential as the original author in shaping the meaning of a text:
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The literary historian who classifies a work in its tradition and explains it historically are
first simply readers before their reflexive relationship to literature can become productive
again. In the triangle of author, work, and public the last is no passive part, no chain of
mere reactions, but rather itself an energy formative of history. 185
Some have misgivings about such a method because they are accustomed to making
substantiated historical claims to truth. They might worry they are committing the unpardonable
sin of eisegesis, distorting the receiving text and reading into it what is not there, or that their
analysis lacks academic rigor. But reception is less concerned with positivist assertions and more
about the creative process of reading. It asks a different question from a text: if the horizon of
expectations is replete with classical myths, how does this alter the reading of a text? How would
a classicist read this text differently than one who does not have the myths in their personal
repertoire? “Criticism then necessarily becomes . . . a series of swerves after unique acts of
creative misunderstanding.” 186
With this method, the scholar pairs a modern text with a classical myth without any need
to prove explicit, historical, or paratextual connections. The myth selection is often based on a
“resonance” similar to that discussed with intertextuality; the scholar instinctively identifies
similarities in plot, theme, symbolism, or character types. The story patterns in the myth (or
rather, the story patterns which the scholar as a reader has read into the myth) become the
framework for analyzing the modern text. Elizabeth Manwell employed such a method when
comparing the animated film Brave (2012), in which the princess Merida transforms her mother
into a bear, with the ancient female initiation rituals at Brauron, in which young women dress up
as bears:
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There is no explicit connection between the Greek tales of girls and bears and the story
that features in Brave; . . . Yet the resonances between these two sets of tales are
provocative. In this section I set the tale of Merida alongside ancient Greek tales and
rituals that link girlhood and bearhood, not because one is influenced by the other but
rather because I think that Merida’s tale may offer us a new lens through which to
examine a perplexing set of ancient stories and experiences. 187
Here the theme of young women passing into adulthood and the symbolism of bears are present
in both the ancient and the modern world, making the two ripe for comparison.
It is only when the modern text is viewed through the lens of a myth that certain patterns
become visible. When the scholar overlays the mythic narrative, disparate aspects of the modern
text may now appear connected through the mythic schema. Plot points or character traits that
once seemed insignificant or relegated to the background now pop to the foreground because of
they deviate from the expected mythic patterns. Thus a scholar can create new, intriguing
interpretations of texts that would otherwise be overlooked.
Reception also has the added benefit of forcing the scholar to re-examine the classical
myth in light of the modern text. Because meaning is not located in objective, chronological
history, but rather in the mind of the reader, modern usages of myth can also anachronistically
influence the meaning of their classical antecedents. Influence then does not only flow from past
to present, but from present to past. Martindale was among the first to note this in the field of
classics, saying, “Homer has been changed for us by Virgil and Milton, who have left their traces
in his text, and thereby enabled new possibilities of meaning.” 188 Since then others have noted
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that “the relationship between ancient and modern is reciprocal,” 189 that “modern acts of
reception challenge linear notions of time,” 190 that usages “resists the easy linear structures of
straightforward readings of ‘influence’ that seem to presume a greater value in whatever comes
first,” 191 and that reception “may subtly reinflect [ancient texts’] meaning . . . [as] the effect of
influence is less bound by the laws of physics.” 192 The same similarities and differences with the
modern text can highlight new patterns in the ancient myth, allowing for new interpretations in
even the most picked-over ground.
This method makes no claim to historical connections, but the interpretations it forms are
just as “correct” as those obtained through more conventional means; as Jauss explains, “even
when in the end significance apparently ‘springs out’ on its own, it nonetheless presupposes
hermeneutically a preconception, however often unadmitted.” 193 Therefore even traditionally
historical interpretations of texts and influences contain subconscious subjective elements. The
evidence from the text is always unintelligible until a reader shapes it into an interpretation. To
use a classical myth as a starting point in this shaping process is just as valid as using historical
records.
There are limits to reception, however. While theoretically any myth can be paired with
any text, some myths work far better for certain texts than others. When a myth is matched with
a text that has little to no thematic points of connection, the comparison will feel forced. The text
as a concrete and fixed object provides a counterweight to fanciful comparisons, as the evidence
that arises from it can only be stretched so far before becoming strained. If the scholar exceeds
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the horizon of expectations set forth by the text, receptive interpretation is less effective, as Jauss
explains:
As long as the interpreter claims to make concrete a specific coherence of significance
from out of the horizon of meaning of this text, and would not, for example, exercise the
license of allegoresis to translate the meaning of the text into a foreign context, that is, to
give it a significance transcending the horizon of meaning and thereby the intentionality
of the text. The interpretation of a poetic text always presupposes aesthetic perception as
its pre-understanding; it may only concretize significances that appeared or could have
appeared possible to the interpreter within the horizon of his preceding reading. 194
A good rule of thumb is to treat the mythic overlay as scaffolding to an interpretation rather than
integral to its structure. Once the scholar gains new insights and connections through comparison
with a classical myth, she should be able to remove all references to the myth and still have a
coherent argument based on evidence from the modern text.
As long as scholars do not try to overextend their claims to either historicism or allegory,
reception can be a useful analytical tool which allows for imaginative readings outside the
normal scope of traditional interpretations. It taps into the wealth of texts stored within the
reader’s mind, since “the literary academic or student reads many texts throughout their learning
career and the more texts they read the more echoes, parallels, and points of comparison they
identify in the texts they encounter.” 195 Key interpretations created through the mythic lens that
would otherwise be invalid under the requirements of adaptation, allusion, or even intertextuality
are now able to enrich the understanding of readers when they encounter a modern text.
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Example: The Death of Persephone in El laberinto del fauno

Guillermo del Toro’s El laberinto del fauno (2006) 196 is a rich intertextual film that
combines fairy tales, Spanish history, children’s literature, mythology, film homages, and the
director’s own nightmares. Set in the aftermath of the Spanish civil war, it follows the struggle
between a fascist military outpost and the remnant of resistance fighters in the woods, focalized
through the fascist captain’s step-daughter Ofelia. The young girl, who is fascinated with fairy
tales, meets a faun in a nearby ancient labyrinth. The creature sets her on dangerous trials to
prove her worth and reclaim her place as the princess of a magical subterranean kingdom.
Typical of the ambiguity of magical realism, it is never clear if the magic is a product of Ofelia’s
imagination or a very real and secret underworld. At the end of the film Captain Vidal shoots his
own step-daughter, but she appears to enter the mythic other world as she dies.
The very title of the film acknowledges two classical sources: Daedalus’ labyrinth which
housed the minotaur and the frisky goat-men of the Italian wilds (and their Greek counterparts
the satyrs). But instead of analyzing the explicit classical references, I will examine the film
through the lens of the Persephone myth. I make no claim that this myth had any direct or
indirect influence on del Toro while he made the film, but I will instead use the myth as a
framework for understanding the theme of Death in the story. Like Persephone, Ofelia confronts
death and remains in the underworld to rule. Her subjective, magical world-view allows the
viewer to confront the difficult past through a narrative lens while her self-sacrifice allows for
Spain to heal from the horrors of its civil war.
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Of particular interest are the fairy tales Ofelia reads to herself, which in turn introduce the
fantastic world around her. Ofelia never becomes directly involved in the political struggle which
engulfs the adults; she never smuggles supplies to the rebels hiding in the woods or spies on her
step-father, as the servant Mercedes does. Instead her contribution is one of commentary through
storytelling; her magical adventures place the adults’ violent struggle into a larger, allegorical
context. 197 I will focus my analysis on these fairy tales, what new meanings become apparent
when compared to the Persephone story, and how they fit thematically into the historical
narrative of the film.
Both stories use a flower as a call-to-action at the beginning of the narrative. In the
Homeric Hymn to Demeter, Gaia creates a flower to lure Persephone; when she takes hold of the
wondrous gift, the earth opens up and Hades drags her to the underworld. The flower’s beauty is
real, but it causes Persephone’s figurative death as Hades abducts her into the realm of the dead.
She becomes the literal bride of Death, a common motif in classical culture to describe a maiden
who died before her time. Picking the flower is the impetus for the story.
Ofelia likewise creates a flower for her unborn brother’s bedtime story, one that grants
immortality but is surrounded by venomous thorns. It thus represents a paradox: eternal life can
only be reached by passing through death. No one dares approach it, so it remains “olvidada y
perdida, en la cima de aquella montaña de piedra fría, sola, hasta el fin de los tiempos” [forgotten
and lost, on the top of that mountain of cold rock, alone, until the end of time]. In contrast to
Persephone’s flower, which she picks immediately, Ofelia’s story offers an alternate version
where the incredible flower is never picked. The heroine’s story cannot begin until the flower is
taken, but to pick it is to die. The same night Ofelia tells her story, a fairy leads her to the
197
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labyrinth to meet the faun and begin her quest. She, at least, is willing to risk the thorns and pass
through death.
This story serves as a commentary on the rebels’ ongoing fight against fascism and the
more general issue of risking death for a better life. Both Mercedes and the doctor, who work for
Vidal but secretly aid the rebels with supplies and medicine, wonder if they are cowards for not
confronting the captain more directly, or if they have already taken too great a risk with their
clandestine defiance and will soon be killed. Their talk is an echo of Ofelia’s story: “Entre los
hombres sólo se hablaba del miedo a la muerte y al dolor pero nunca de la promesa de la
inmortalidad” [Among men only fear of death and of pain were spoken of, but never the promise
of immortality]. The rebels never talk about winning, only about fighting and the inevitability of
their death. They have no hope of a free and democratic Spain, the equivalent of the eternal life
that the flower offers, but they fight anyway. In the original script, Ofelia’s story was more
explicitly didactic: “Porque en los hombres pesaba más el miedo al dolor que la promesa de la
inmortalidad” 198 [Because fear of pain weighed more heavily on men than the promise of
immortality]. Ofelia, however, for all her fear and despair, does have hope that she will pass into
a magical underground “donde no existe la mentira ni el dolor” [where there is no lying nor
pain]. Her youth and naïvete grant her the optimism that the adults lack, and she is able to
convey that hope through her stories, just as the director conveys hope through the story of the
film.
Picking the flower leads to Persephone’s figurative death, but it also makes her queen of
the underworld; Ofelia similarly sets out on her quest and dies but becomes a princess in the
underground kingdom. To put it into the terms of her flower story, the poisoned thorns kill her,
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but she still manages to reach the flower of immortality. And on a historical level, the rebels all
die in their conflict with the far more powerful fascist government, but eventually achieve a
democratic Spain decades in the future. Death then serves as a portal to something better, if only
the protagonists have the courage to pass through it.
In this quest, the faun serves both the role of psychopomp and Hades figure as an
ambiguous guide. Although Ofelia immediately trusts the imposing faun, the audience is never
certain whether he is friend or foe. 199 Mercedes draws on folklore tradition and warns Ofelia,
saying, “Pues mi abuela decía que con los faunos hay que andarse con cuidado” [Well, my
grandmother would say that one must tread carefully with fauns]. Jack Zipes notes that the
“trustworthiness of the faun, who is immense and weird-looking, ancient and sphinxlike, is
clearly meant to be ambiguous; he appears to be kind and gentle sometimes and mean and
menacing at other times.” 200 What makes him in part disturbing is his looming and brutish
figure; it hints at a violent masculinity prepared to pounce on the naïve and helpless young girl
when she is alone in the labyrinth or her bedroom. Fauns and satyrs, after all, are known for their
excessive concupiscence, which makes the faun of the film “a much more problematic,
transgressive and potentially dangerous character, forever on the edge of sexual maturity.” 201
While he never does cross a sexual line with Ofelia, he does lead her to the underworld through
her own death. This recalls Hades, who rapes Persephone (in the sense of both kidnap and sexual
assault) and brings her to the underworld, effectively killing her. Yet he also makes her a
powerful queen over the dead, as the faun makes Ofelia a princess in her underground kingdom.
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This reinforces the theme of death as an ambiguous force in life, one that is dangerous but also
powerful.
The Pale Man is another incarnation of death: his pallor is that of a corpse, his frame is
skeletal, and even his name evokes the pale horse of Revelations upon which Death rides. 202 The
sagging folds of his skin hint at an insatiable, ravenous hunger, while the pile of children’s shoes
that Ofelia spies in his chamber are a testament to the many he has consumed before her. The
pile also “alludes to the various Holocaust depictions of piles of victims’ clothing,” 203 another
connection with the destruction of fascism. In this way the Pale Man/Death is an obsessive
consumer of lives. The only other figure in the film with a similar violent death count is the
fascist Captain Vidal, which makes him an even worse monster. 204
The interdiction Ofelia receives for this task maps well onto Persephone’s story. As the
faun is careful to explain, “Vereís un lujoso banquete. No comaís ni bebaís nada de él mientras
estaís allí. Absolutamente nada—Os va la vida en ello” [You will see a luxurious banquet. You
will not eat or drink anything from it while you are there. Absolutely nothing—Your life depends
on it]. Ofelia, like all fairy tale protagonists, ignores the warning and eats two grapes; as a result
the monster awakens and attempts to eat her, but she escapes. Persephone may likewise only
leave the underworld if she has not eaten anything while there. She violates the taboo and can
therefore leave the land of the dead for only a time. Ofelia’s escape from Death, like
Persephone’s, is temporary. Just as the goddess must return to the underworld at the end of
summer, Ofelia will die and return to her underground realm at the end of the film. As the faun
said, her life depends on not eating, and her disobedience to the faun, mirrored in her
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disobedience to Vidal, results in her eventual demise. The audience knows from the opening shot
of Ofelia bleeding on the ground that she is destined to die, and it is only a question of when and
how.
However, this death becomes a necessary sacrifice to continue a cycle of rebirth. A major
part of the Persephone myth is its etiological explanation for the seasons. When Persephone is
taken into the underworld each winter, her mother Demeter withers the world’s plants in sorrow.
With Persephone’s return in the spring, the world once again becomes verdant and fertile. 205
Humans depend on her figurative resurrection from the land of the dead, since their food supply
is linked to her return. Ofelia also goes through a series of deaths and rebirths. She is presumably
born in the underground kingdom (paradoxically born into death), then escapes to the surface
world (comes to life), where she dies and is reborn as a human. She then dies but is reanimated
in the underground kingdom where she rules for many centuries. Presumably she dies again after
that. This series of births and deaths—as well as crossing in and out of the underworld during the
film proper—links her to Persephone. She moves between the world of the dead and the living,
the magical and the mundane. However, Persephone brings life by resurrecting each spring,
while Ofelia brings healing by passing back into the underworld through death. She must pass
down into the earth at the roots of the tree to kill the toad, down into the underground lair of the
Pale Man to retrieve the sacrificial dagger, and finally pour her own blood into the subterranean
heart of the labyrinth to open the portal to her father’s underworld kingdom. Death becomes
essential to moving the fairy-tale world forward, just as the rebels’ sacrifice moves Spain past the
stagnation of fascism.
Ofelia’s first task is especially one of restoring fertility for the benefit of others. She reads
the mythic history of a tree she must heal from her story book:
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Al principio de los tiempos cuando el bosque era joven, vivían en armonía los animales,
los hombres y las criaturas mágicas. Se protegían los unos a los otros y dormían juntos
bajo la sombra de un frondoso árbol . . . Ahora el árbol se muere . . . Debajo de sus raíces
ha anidado un enorme sapo que no lo deja sanar.
[At the beginning of time, when the forest was young, animals, men and magical
creatures lived together in harmony. They protected one another and slept together under
the shade of a leafy tree . . . Now the tree is dying . . . Beneath its roots has nested an
enormous toad that does not let it heal]
In Ofelia’s tale the different factions lived together in harmony, and the tree they slept under
becomes a symbol of this peace. With the death of the tree, it is implied that the former harmony
is also fading, that the different creatures no longer protect one another and instead are either
self-centered or outright hostile. The parallels with Spain become apparent in the real-world
violence; her adventure with the tree and toad are intercut with scenes of Vidal’s first foray into
the forest to an abandoned rebel campsite. The country had a time of peace and unity before the
civil war, but this antebellum harmony has ended and the two factions are at war. Although the
fascist government gained control, Spain still was not healing into unity. The brutality and
monolithic nature of fascism made any reconciliation impossible. The tree, as a symbol of
Spain’s harmony, cannot bloom while the poisonous toad of fascism sits at its roots.
Ofelia defeats the toad, and the final shot of the film is of a white flower blooming on the
tree, demonstrating that she successfully healed it. The voice-over narration reveals, “dejó detrás
de sí pequeñas huellas de su paso por el mundo visibles sólo para aquél que sepa dónde mirar”
[she left behind her small traces of her passing through the world, visible only for those who
know where to look]. Her repeated forays into the underworld allow her to fix what others
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cannot. While her impact is clearer in the mythic world, it is more difficult to discern her
influence in the historical parallel. The other characters are unaware of her interventions or
openly scoff at them as childish imaginations. However, the audience knows and understands the
significance of her quest; it is they who listen to Ofelia’s fairy tales. She must die both at the
beginning and the end of the film in order to resurrect the memory of the civil war, to relive the
conflict in all its gore through storytelling. After a decades-long taboo on this dark moment of
Spain’s history, Ofelia’s experiences and narrative reconstruct the events and present them naked
in their brutality, “exhuming that which has been hidden and silenced.” 206 Rather than bringing
spring back from the underworld, Ofelia brings dark memories that must be confronted. The film
offers itself as a healing balm to the viewers, reminding them that their current peace is
purchased with blood, and that historical divides can fester when left unchecked.
These thematic points concerning death, though already present in the film, take on new
meaning when ordered through the Persephone myth. Death is inevitable, but ultimately
ennobling. It is a sacrifice that requires courage but allows for a larger reshaping of narrative and
perspective that can bring healing. While it would be a mistake to think of Ofelia solely as a
Persephone figure and discount other aspects of her character, nevertheless it is useful to focus
on these similarities (and differences) to illuminate both del Toro’s film and the ancient myth.
Reception at the point of the scholar allows for this new reading to take shape.
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Chapter 5: Typology
Typology takes many variants of a narrative and combines them into an abstraction
against which new texts of the same type are compared. While other methods of analysis
compare texts directly, typology acknowledges that much interpretation occurs through
subconscious and imprecise abstractions. I have mentioned something similar in previous
chapters; a nebulous “essence” can be found in both the classical and the new text that allows the
reader to instinctively identify the two texts as related. This is the mind’s reflexive mechanism to
understand the new in terms of the familiar; it compresses individual narratives into repetitive
patterns, or in other words, as types. As Ernst Hans Josef Gombrich explains: “The idea of some
basic scaffolding or armature that determines the ‘essence’ of things, reflects our need for a
schema with which to grasp the infinite variety of this world of change.” 207 Once a scholar
becomes aware of his own typology, he can use it as an analytical tool to draw new connections
between texts. As Roland Barthes succinctly states, “The analysis seeks to establish a narrative
model—which is evidently formal—, a structure or grammar of narrative, on the basis of which
(once this model, structure, or grammar has been discovered) each particular narrative will be
analysed in terms of divergences.” 208
Typology works somewhat differently than other methods thus far explored. Adaptation,
allusion, and intertextuality all flow chronologically from ancient sources into later works.
Reception, for all that it does not require historical links between the author and an ancient
source, is still the reader’s deliberate comparison of a specific ancient text with a later work.
With typology, however, all works are treated as ahistorical, where the ancient text and the
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modern novel are contemporaries in the present mind of the reader. To quote Iser, “in the timeflow of the reading process, past and future continually converge in the present moment, and the
synthesizing operations of the wandering viewpoint enable the text to pass through the reader’s
mind as an ever-expanding network of connections.” 209 Classical myths are decentralized as only
one more point of many, which are organized around an abstract idea. This gives a more accurate
description of the subjective reading experience in the mind of the reader by comparing a gestalt
type to a specific text rather than the objective, historical process of chronological influence.

Problems with Past Typological Approaches

Typology was more popular in the mid-20th century before the advent of deconstruction
and poststructuralism, which led to many scholars discounting it because they saw it as a biased
system of analysis which was unaware of its own lack of objectivity. Many were and are
skeptical of efforts to create a “master narrative” for types. Carl Jung, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and
Northrop Frye all strove to discover a universal underlying structure to mythology and literature,
but poststructuralist critics have called their methods into question. The primary criticisms are
that typological structures are ahistorical, ignore significant differences between texts in favor of
their similarities, and are interested only in advancing the master narrative at the expense of
individual works. For Jauss, who emphasized the connection between literature and history, the
ahistorical process was particularly egregious:
For Lévi-Strauss every work of art is completely explicable through its function within
the secondary system of reference of society; every act of speech is reduced to a
combinatory element in a primary system of signs; all meaning and individuation merges
209
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into an anonymous, subjectless system, establishing the priority of a spontaneous natural
order over any historical process. 210
If one desires an objective underlying structure, this critique is valid. Once a scholar has
developed an interpretive system which he believes to have arisen naturally and without artifice
from the texts themselves, the system remains inflexible and all contradictory variants of a type
must be made to conform to his schema, oftentimes resulting in truly bizarre contortions to
achieve the desired results. If evidence cannot be reconciled to the whole, it is discounted with
no explanation as to why it could not fit into the organizational structure, which does not take
into account historical transformations of types nor allows for adaptations in the analytical
model. This presents a serious obstacle to claims of a universal, objective organizing principle.
This was also a criticism of Frye’s work, whose approach “effaces differences in favour of
transhistorical patterns and hermetically seals off literature from the world.” 211 Types are
therefore more subjective than objective, with only limited grounding in historical reality.
However, if one desires not an objective system but a description of the subjective
organizing principles that occur during the reading process, typology can be a useful analytical
tool. Even though they are not historically objective or universal constants, they nonetheless do
function in literature as repeated and communicable patterns. Types remain a recognizable
bundle of signifiers that are able to communicate an agreed-upon (though openly ambiguous)
series of meanings. Rather than understand types as a naturally occurring pattern, it is more
useful to see them as cultural constructs that guide the individual in interpreting newly
encountered texts. As such, types are not rigid, unchanging universals but flexible, adaptive, and
pliant. They are not pre-formed but are learned and constantly developing through life-long
Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, 67.
Travis Decook, “Northrop Frye and the Book as Metaphor and Material Artefact,” University of Toronto
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reading. The works that are excluded from the formation of a type are done on an individual and
cultural basis. Each individual or culture decides what to include in the type and what to exclude,
since the processes of categorization are unique. It makes no claim to universality but is a
product of the individual’s reading history. Rather than insist on conformity and similarities, the
differences between an individual work and its abstract type are just as important and revealing.
This is in keeping with Genette’s concept of transtextuality, which focuses on the ever-changing
relationship between text and the larger network of texts, which produces meaning. 212 This
allows for a permeable and fluid typology that nonetheless remains consistent enough to function
as a reference tool for understanding the relationships between classical myths and other similar
stories.
By drawing on Iser’s reader response theory to create a more malleable and
individualized typology, scholars are able to use this method to compare classical myths to many
other similar texts at once. Typology seeks to articulate the subconscious abstractions and
amalgamations that occur regularly when people read. While each individual does this slightly
differently, humans have enough in common, especially when they share a common culture such
as the western classical tradition, to make individuals’ types mutually intelligible. Based on this
more subjective approach, typology can be employed towards fruitful analysis without the
drawbacks of earlier structuralist constraints.
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Formation of Types

In order to discuss types, a distinction must be made between the collective abstract type
and the individual texts that comprise it. Just as Saussure observes how “language stands in
opposition to utterance in the same way as does that which is social to that which is
individual,” 213 types are the general rule that govern the content of individual texts, which in turn
are “utterances” of the type. To a young child, the individual text of a type is unintelligible, just
as the culturally-specific text is unintelligible to a foreigner. In order to make meaning out of a
text, one must place it within a larger typological structure, but these type-structures must first be
constructed in the mind through exposure to multiple texts of the same type. A text in isolation is
nonsensical, but after the reader encounters three or four similar texts, his mind begins to form
patterns from the similarities. Eventually these patterns solidify into a type, a loose bundle of
perceived similarities that the reader expects to be universal for all texts that can be categorized
together. Once the type is so familiar that the reader no longer registers it as unusual, the type
structure has established itself as part of the subconscious reading process, and the reader can be
said to be fluent in this type. This is part of the process of mastering a language and a culture.
However, this process of categorization is subjective rather than scientific. It is here that
Lévi-Strauss erred, believing that if a sufficient number of utterances were gathered, then the
differences between them would fall away and that an underlying master type-structure would
emerge as self-evident. Instead, the individual mind constructs types, both in the selection of
texts to include in the type as well as how those texts are organized within the typological
structure, meaning that Lévi-Strauss’ structure is more a reflection of his own mind’s work
Valentin Nikólaievich Vološinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1986), 60–61.
213

99

instead of a universal truism, no matter how many data points or myths he places into it. As Iser
points out,
Consistency-building itself is not an illusion-making process, but consistency comes
about through gestalt groupings, and these contain traces of illusion in so far as their
closure—since it is based on selection—is not a characteristic of the text itself, but only
represents a configurative meaning . . . It is the reader who unfolds the network of
possible connections, and it is the reader who then makes a selection from that
network. 214
Therefore, despite the subjective nature of types, their relative consistency in the reader’s mind is
essential for meaning-making in the reading process. This conceptual shift from objective to
subjective structure validates typological thinking.
Types do not hold a reified existence. As Barthes notes, types as narrative codes “are
simply associative fields, a supra-textual organization of notations which impose a certain idea of
structure; the instance of the code is, for us, essentially cultural.” 215 They are the summation of
many different discrete utterances that are organized in the human mind. Or as Iser stated: “We
do not grasp it like an empirical object; nor do we comprehend it like a predicative fact; it owes
its presence in our minds to our own reactions, and it is these that make us animate the meaning
of the text as a reality.” 216 To use another analogy, texts can be likened to projectors set up in a
circle, all projecting different images onto the same central spot. The images overlap and create a
composite image that cannot exist without the continued individual projections. If many of the
projectors display the same or a very similar image, that part of the composite projection will
become clearer and appear more solid. Where the images differ, the composite projection is
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blurred. In the same way, individual texts exist discretely, but project a gestalt type in the mind
of a reader. The form of the type depends on the individual texts that comprise it. Repeated plot
points, characters, and themes will become a clear aspect of the type, while variations will be
marginalized. Thus, types hold only a theoretical existence dependent on concrete texts.
After the type has been established in the reader’s mind, it is paradoxically stable and in
constant flux. When a reader encounters a new text, he uses the pre-existing type in his mind to
understand it. Points of similarity to the type he has already developed strengthen the existing
type, like ruts carved out by the passage of many wheels. However, the points of contrast
destabilize the type. The reader must either ignore these differences, relegating them to the
periphery of the type, 217 or incorporate them into the type, which will restructure the concept he
has developed in his mind. As Iser explains, this process of “the reader’s incorporation of the text
into his own treasure-house of experience . . . [is an] aesthetic effect [which] results in a
restructuring of experience.” 218 On occasion a reader will encounter a text so radically different
than his type that it will shatter existing patterns and reconfigure the type around the new text.
This can be positive (epiphany and transcendence) or negative (existential crisis). The meaning
of all previous texts that make up the type will also change based on their new position in the
typological structure. But this type of drastic reconfiguration is far less common than the usually
gradual process of type modification. Normally a reader will encounter texts with only slight
variations from his typological schema, and the changes to his type are so minor that he does not
notice the alteration. Over time these small changes can create large alterations in the type, but
the gradual nature of the process gives the illusion of stable, consistent types:
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Our image is therefore constantly shifting, and every image we have is duly restructured
by each of its successors . . . the facets appear to clash, but we are then obliged to
incorporate the new circumstances—which means retrospective changes to our past
images . . . we do not try to seize upon one particular aspect, but we are made to view
him as a synthesis of all aspects. 219
Conceptualizing types as in flux allows for a more flexible analytical framework. Specific texts
do not need to be mutilated to fit into a preconceived system, but can exist in contradictory terms
alongside a reader’s current type. When the reader either places more weight to the significance
of the discrepant text or he encounters enough similar contradictory examples, the entire
structure of the type can shift. This enables a much broader scope than earlier structuralist
conceptions because, as Barthes notes, reading “is observed not as a finished, closed product, but
as a production in progress, ‘plugged in’ to other texts, other codes (this is the intertextual), and
thereby articulated with society and history in ways which are not determinist but citational.” 220
Not only do readers use types to understand texts, but authors draw on types to create
texts in the first place. Explaining this process is difficult as the relation between text and type is
ouroboric. The author draws on a pre-existing type to create a new text. The text in turn
influences the cultural type, which will in turn spawn new texts as other authors draw on the
type, and so on ad infinitum.
Performance theory is a useful means of understanding this relationship between the type
and the author’s creation of new texts, since “texts and their readings can embody performance
theory and practice.” 221 Each type is like a script, while each reproduction of the type in the form
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of a concretized text is a performance of the type. Yet as I have already discussed, the script is
not static, but is altered in the very process of performing a new text. Thus, text and type
mutually create each other. John Frow uses performance theory to explain genre, which
functions in a similar way to typology: “Texts do not simply have uses which are mapped out in
advance by the genre: they are themselves uses of genre, performances of or allusions to the
norms and conventions which form them and which they may, in turn, transform.” This allows
scholars to transition “to a more reflexive model in which texts are thought to use or to perform
the genres by which they are shaped.” 222 While texts rely on genre for form, they depend on
types for content. In both cases larger cultural patterns govern the foundation of the text to which
the author either conforms or rebels against.
Judith Butler likewise developed a theory of performativity to explain the cultural
construction of gender, which functions in the same way as literary types. In many ways
masculinity and femininity are specific types that are governed by the same principles of
reflexive formation, which is
An expectation that ends up producing the very phenomenon that it anticipates. In the
first instance, then, the performativity of gender revolves around this tealepsis, the way in
which the anticipation of a gendered essence produces that which it posits as outside
itself. Secondly, performativity is not a singular act, but a repetition and a ritual, which
achieves its effects through its naturalization in the context of a body, understood, in part,
as a culturally sustained temporal duration. 223
Literary types inscribe themselves onto the bodies of specific texts, which in turn become
transmitters of the type in the creation of future texts. Types, like gender, are performative,
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holding no “natural” existence outside of humanity’s repetition and reenactment of what appears
to be stable. Type gives rise to text, which gives rise to type. Although types appear to be the
“origin and cause” of textual patterns, they are “in fact the effects of institutions, practices,
discourses with multiple and diffuse points of origin.” 224
In some ways, types are similar to Plato’s ideal forms. When an author wants to write a
character, he draws on a type in his mind, mixing the abstract with concrete details to create a
mimetic utterance of the type. All utterances of a type from the same author will have a common
source. However, unlike the Platonic forms, types do not reside in a heavenly realm, but in the
mind of each author. And while forms are unchanging constants, types are constantly changing.
Each new utterance the author creates—as well as each utterance the author encounters as a
reader—subtly (or radically) shifts the total composition of the type.
If types are formed in individual minds, how is it possible that types are mutually
intelligible and communicable? If a type were wholly individualized, typology would be next to
useless in analyzing usages of classical mythology because whatever system or structure a
scholar develops would be incomprehensible to anyone else. The new text an author writes by
drawing on types would likewise be nonsensical. Somehow each person’s type must be similar
enough to others’ that they are able to communicate a semi-stable meaning.
It is useful to distinguish between an individual mind’s type and the collective cultural
type. If the individual type is an abstracted gestalt of concrete texts, then the cultural type is a
gestalt of individual types, an abstraction formed from many abstractions. It is an inversion of
the Platonic form, where specific utterances are real and permanent and give rise to unstable
abstract ideas. Types rely on communal knowledge to convey meaning, and “there are . . .
particular bodies of texts and source material, such as myth . . . which by their very nature seem
224
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to depend on this communality of shared understanding and access . . . they participate in a very
active way in a shared community of knowledge.” 225 An author expects that he can produce an
utterance from his personal understanding of a type and pass that utterance to the reader, who
will place the utterance in her own type structure to interpret it.
Unfortunately, no two people ever have an identical conception of a type. Even if they
were exposed to identical utterances, both through art and life experience, they would produce
very similar but nonetheless minutely different typological concepts. Types shared within a
culture (and some types which are shared across all human experiences) are similar enough to
allow for communication. But types, like words, do not have a fixed meaning, which makes
communication imperfect. As Gram Allen states, “Texts do not present clear and stable
meanings; they embody society’s dialogic conflict over the meaning of words. If a novelist, for
example, uses the words ‘natural’ or ‘artificial’ or ‘God’ or ‘justice’ they cannot help but
incorporate into their novel society’s conflict over the meanings of those words.” 226 An utterance
attempts to convey an author’s concept of a type, but no utterance can ever hold an entire
typological system, just as a word can never convey the full personalized connotation from the
author to the reader. The meaning of a type is formed over years of coalescing utterances.
Likewise, the reader can only understand the utterance by receiving it into her own typological
structure, which will necessarily alter the context of the utterance and its meaning. Thus, perfect
typological communication is impossible.
However, the utterance still carries some of the author’s typology, and the structure of
author and reader are similar enough that the reader will place the utterance into a similar
position in her structure. Thus, the author succeeds in conveying a portion of his type. The
225
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addition of the new utterance has now altered the total composition of the reader’s type, though
not necessarily in the way that the author intended. This imperfect replication of types, however,
allows for creative transformations; each new utterance is the result of an imperfectly
communicated type.
Communication of types makes possible not only the creation and reading of new texts,
but also allows scholars to outline their own typology and communicate it with others. This
invites other scholars to momentarily organize their own typology in the same way in order to
comprehend the new patterns that run through multiple texts that the scholar wishes to share.
Typology can thus be employed as an analytical tool as well as a creative one.

Typology as Methodology

Usually types, as unconscious abstractions, function without conscious knowledge in the
mind of the reader. But if a scholar wishes to use typology as an analytical tool, she must
articulate her personal types to serve as a point of comparison. The first step in analyzing a text
typologically therefore begins with writing out the first impressions that come to mind when one
thinks of a type. This often results in a list of characteristics that a text should have in order to be
categorized within a certain type, which is consistent with how types are formed. These are the
clearest, repeatable aspects of overlapping patterns that jump to the foreground seemingly (but
not actually) of their own volition.
This list format is not accidental. Types are not indivisible entities, but are rather bundles
of ideas, traits, concepts, and actions. As Lévi-Strauss explains, “If there is a meaning to be
found in mythology, this cannot reside in the isolated elements which enter into the composition
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of a myth, but only in the way those elements are combined.” 227 Lévi-Strauss later calls these
smaller elements “mythemes,” but they have also been called “lexias,” 228 “fabulae,” 229 and other
terms. For simplicity’s sake I will use mythemes. Brett Rogers notes how mythemes combine
into a recognizable structure, a “particular narrative syntagm—a particular assemblage, possibly
in an ordered sequence—identifiably derived from classical antiquity,” where syntagms are “the
different elements of a narrative—such icons, plot points, and narrative themes—as
‘signifiers’.” 230 When a reader recognizes a type, he is not responding to a single object but to
the familiar configuration of many smaller mythemes. This is why different texts of a type are
still identifiable as belonging to the same type. If some mythemes are missing from the reader’s
preconceived type or new mythemes are added, he can still place it within a larger typological
structure so long as enough of the new text matches. If too many mythemes are different, then
the reader will not recognize the text as belonging to the same type.
Each scholar subjectively determines what is close enough to be a match as well as how
broad or narrow he defines his type. Even the choice of how to determine mythemes depends on
the scholar. As Barthes notes, the divisions of a type are “an arbitrary product” 231 that differ
between readers, and Robert Young elaborates that “the reader himself is implicated as the
divider of the text into units, and thus has to be aware of his own psychic involvement in the
analysis.” 232
While in the unconscious mind, types are not centered on any one particular text, and
while some texts do exert more influence than others in forming the type, the type itself is
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located between the projecting texts. However, this makes abstract types very difficult to
articulate when a scholar needs an outline of the type to use in analyzing a text. One way around
this is to start with a classical myth. A scholar can retell the myth from memory and then remove
any specific details about the myth until only the bare bones of the plot and character remain.
This uses classical myth as a scaffolding or ordering system in order to articulate types. While
this remains problematic because it ignores the many other texts that form the type in the
subconscious mind, it nevertheless gives the scholar a starting point from which she can begin to
form an articulation of a type.
Types are, of course, formed not only from classical texts and the more influential of
their adaptations, but from all major and minor utterances of the type. Until recently, academics
have concerned themselves mainly with canonical texts, those judged as being of higher aesthetic
quality or greater influence. But types are also formed from many “B-rated” literature and other
media that classical scholars have traditionally avoided studying. 233 The many secondary texts
produced in between the canon are extremely useful for establishing typologies and further
understanding the Western tradition. New additions to the canon are often a rebellion against
stale stereotypes, and the new text will itself spawn many pale imitations until a new stereotype
is established. As Barthes explains:
We must not be worried by the fact that we can constitute extremely banal notations into
code: it is on the contrary their banality, their apparent insignificance that predisposes
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them to codification, given our definition of code: a corpus of rules that are so worn we
take them to be marks of nature. 234
Those characters or plot lines that lack development or innovation are the closest to the reigning
type of the time, and are therefore often the most useful in determining the nature of a type.
A type can focus on a character or a plot, which can in turn be deconstructed into its
component mythemes. For example, the Old Man character type may be the nexus of many
different attributes (wise, kind, senile, insane, frail, slow, grouchy, stubborn, nostalgic, regretful,
melancholic, serene) that the author can pull from to create a specific old man character. Barthes
calls these attributes semes, and when several are taken together from the typological
possibilities they form a concrete character: “Characters in a narrative are basically a collection
of semes . . . Characters are then names to which groups as semes are attracted . . . it is this buildup of semes which creates the impression of ‘depth’, and thus generates the illusion that these
names refer to actual ‘characters’.” 235
The core of the Orpheus and Eurydice plot could be reduced to the following:
● There is a skilled artist.
● He marries.
● His wife is lost unexpectedly.
● He travels to a dangerous place to retrieve her.
● His art is useful on the journey.
● He regains his wife only to lose her again.
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Roger Macfarlane calls this bare-bone outline the “zero-grade” myth, or the core narrative upon
which individual iterations are built. 236 The method is to compare multiple ancient versions of
the myth and find the common points between them, ascribing variance to an author’s
innovation. Details are stripped away until only the essentials of the narrative remain, which is
recognizable in all utterances of the type. Scholars then analyze whatever an author adds or
removes from the zero-grade as significant change.
Other scholars also make use of this listing method to articulate the mythemes of a type.
Gregory Daugherty uses typology to create the requirements of what he calls a “Modyssey,” or
modern Odyssey. 237 Jon Solomon used a similar method to study many different versions of the
Orpheus myth in film and opera. 238 It is an efficient method to find commonalities between texts
one wishes to study so long as the scholar remembers that the mythemes selected are ultimately
subjective.
Once a scholar has articulated the type, he may begin comparing and contrasting it to a
specific text. Any text is only intelligible when placed within a typological structure. By having
articulated his type, the scholar is now able to consciously observe the points of similarities that
reinforce the type and the points of contrast that disrupt and reform the type. Thus, typological
analysis is merely an uncovering of the unconscious reading process. Inevitably, the type will
begin to break down into its constituent texts as the scholar discovers more and more
contradictions. The primary text under analysis will hold similarities to some texts in the type
that contradict similarities to other texts also in the type. While these tensions prohibit any kind
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of universal or fixed structure, they do enrich the scholar’s understanding of the type and of the
text by revealing its multifaceted nature.

Example: The Werewolf Type in Paul Naschy’s Waldemar Daninsky Films

Spain is not known for its werewolf legends in comparison with other European
countries, but there is one notable exception. After living through Spain’s horrific civil war of
the 1930s, Paul Naschy, whose given name is Jacinto Molina Álvarez, left his mark on Spanish
cinema by writing and starring in a series of werewolf films featuring his own original character:
Waldemar Daninsky. Though the films have not aged well since the 1960s and 70s, at the time
they reinvigorated the horror genre in Spain. One way to understand the implications and impact
of these films is to examine them through the lens of the werewolf type. By drawing on many
different werewolf texts produced both before and after Naschy’s works to form an ahistorical
typological system, the films’ adherence and deviations from the werewolf mythos become
apparent and create meaning.
In many ways the films are Naschy’s way of processing the traumatic and violent events
of war from his childhood; they express both horror and fascination for blood and death. Unlike
del Toro, who uses violence as a critique of fascism, Naschy accepts it as a reality of his life.
This trauma brings on an alienation from the self and subsequent distancing from society, a state
which the duel nature of the werewolf can readily convey when other forms of expression are
unintelligible. As Naschy said in an interview about his films:
Quite simply, [the werewolf is] me. The pity is I can’t become a werewolf in true life. All
too often I would like to. It’s obvious that in the works of every man there is much of his
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true self. Like Waldemar, I too have been left aside and misunderstood. I have spent all
my life swimming against the current. 239
The films are also a vanity project; Naschy is able to bring his fantasies of power, sex, and
violence to life on the silver screen and invites the audience to sympathize with his id, mediated
through the werewolf figure. But ultimately the superego triumphs by the end of each film and
societal order is restored. Any residual trauma from the civil war or unresolved anger against the
current regime is metaphorically repressed with the death of Daninsky: the werewolf rages no
more. Typology helps make this pattern clear.
Before I articulate the werewolf type, it is useful to note that it is already decentralized
away from its classical components in the American mind, making it easier to work with in a
typological structure. Although the werewolf makes several appearances in classical literature, 240
many do not consider it classical in origin, as they do other monsters such as the centaur and the
gorgon. Contemporary thought instead centers the werewolf type around newer utterances such
as Lon Chaney Junior’s portrayal of the werewolf in The Wolf Man (1948) and its sequels or the
influential An American Werewolf in London (1981). This makes it easier to focus typological
analysis on the abstracted gestalt rather than a specific classical antecedent, which normally
draws attention to itself due to its chronological precedence. Naschy’s films further lend
themselves to typology because, though he made many werewolf films with the same character,
each film is unconnected narratively from the others. As Naschy himself put it, “Unlike the films
about Lawrence Talbot (Lon Chaney Jr.) which had a certain continuity, Waldemar Daninsky
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can move freely through space and time.” 241 In each film Daninsky is infected and killed without
any reference to the previous films. Naschy believes that “the werewolf should die in each film,
only to be reborn in the next.” 242 This loose narrative form works well with typology; just as
each type makes related but unconnected utterances, Naschy draws on the same werewolf type to
create similar but distinct iterations of the werewolf story.
The first step in typological analysis is to articulate the type in the scholar’s mind, a
description of the general shape and characteristics of the type which are drawn from the
combined texts the scholar has read. Then the scholar can proceed to map out of the subjective
connections and networks in greater detail. What follows below is therefore my own subjective
gestalt of the werewolf type, formed from the hundreds of werewolf books, films, comics and
other media which I have consumed. Unlike a traditional essay which is confined to a narrow
thesis, this kind of analysis is expansive and nonlinear, jumping from one strand of web to
another. The werewolf type in particular is especially multifaceted and variable over time, and I
only include the aspects that touch upon Naschy’s films. In other words, the goal is to
contextualize his films within certain sections of the werewolf type rather than stretch them to fit
the entire expansive framework.
My werewolf type focuses on recurring plot points common to many different werewolf
texts. Therefore, the following list will help the reader better understand how one might interpret
Naschy’s Waldemar Daninsky within a typological schema. The mythemes are as follows:
•

The werewolf is a cursed entity.

•

The werewolf is a violent cannibal.

•

The werewolf is an outcast, or Other.
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•

The werewolf uses his strength to save loved ones (the hero).

•

The werewolf is obsessed with finding a cure.

Each of these plot aspects reveals the way in which Naschy revels in violence, highlighting the
animal aspects of human nature evident in his lifetime, before turning to more altruistic concerns.
The werewolf type often involves a curse motif, in which his transformation is
involuntary and controlled through greater supernatural powers. Among the classical sources,
werewolves often became cursed through the will of deities: Zeus transforms King Lycaon into a
wolf as punishment for serving human flesh to the god, while the goddess Circe likewise
transforms men into animals, including wolves. Even the first werewolf story, from the Epic of
Gilgamesh, is about how the goddess Ishtar curses a man to become a wolf. Naschy places his
werewolves into a similarly religious context by drawing on the Catholic mythos and ascribing
the curse to Satanic origins. While most often Daninsky becomes a werewolf through the bite of
another werewolf, which follows the Lawrence Talbot pattern, in El retorno de Walpurgis
(1973), Naschy lavishes attention on an extended origin story for the werewolf. Medieval
witches have placed a hereditary curse on Daninsky’s ancestor, and contemporary Satan
worshippers seduce and then activate the werewolf in Daninsky himself. In this way, the same
supernatural motif from classical texts is transformed for a contemporary context.
This mytheme tends to highlight humanity’s lack of power against forces greater than
themselves. The gods’ motives are different in each story (justice, boredom, vengeance), but in
all cases the man is powerless to prevent the gods from stripping him of his very humanity. He is
as the driven leaf, whose control over his own life can be removed at a whim. Although
Daninsky chains himself up every full moon and isolates himself away from human
communities, his wolf form inevitably breaks free and finds humans to hunt. The curse of
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lycanthropy reflects the human propensity towards violence, which can surface so suddenly and
uncontrollably that it can certainly seem like a curse bestowed by some supernatural entity.
On the other hand, the transformation could be viewed not as a curse which compels a
man to violence but merely something which reveals his true nature. Ovid explains this
succinctly when describing Lycaon’s transformation:
Fit lupus et veteris servat vestigia formae;
canities eadem est, eadem violentia vultus,
idem oculi lucent, eadem feritatis imago est. 243
[He is made a wolf and retains traces of his old form; his grey hair is the same, the same
violent face; his eyes gleam the same; the image of beastliness is the same.]
Lycaon was already bloodthirsty, and the wolf form is hardly a change in nature. The curse of
lycanthropy allows men to give vent to their darker urges, but these impulses already exist as a
natural part of the human psyche. Naschy has plenty of unsavory human characters in his films,
from a rapist handyman to superstitious villagers who mutilate corpses. They accord with the
violent soldiers and townspeople from his life. The werewolf is just one more manifestation of
humanity’s capacity for horror. Hundreds of werewolf horror films centered on gore follow
Naschy’s lead, testifying to the staying power of the motif.
As a liminal figure that crosses boundaries, the werewolf is also a figure who can break
engrained social taboos, 244 and Sabing-Gould notes that cannibalism, a most severe taboo, is at
the heart of many werewolf stories. 245 This is how Plato interprets the myth when he compares
werewolves to tyrants: both begin as men but become wolves when they first taste human
Ov.Met.1.237–239
Brent Stypczynski, Evolution of the Werewolf Archetype from Ovid to J.K. Rowling, Diss. Kent State University,
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blood. 246 However, Naschy departs from this aspect of the type; his werewolf kills but never
consumes his victims. There may be several reasons for this departure. One is that Naschy drew
his inspiration most heavily from Lon Chaney’s Universal Pictures wolf-man, who was likewise
a picky eater. Censorship during the fascist period may have also curtailed Naschy’s otherwise
gruesome tastes. Yet the senselessness of the killing may be just as horrific as the cannibalistic
predilections of other werewolf characters. Animals that hunt and eat humans, while fearsome,
are nonetheless comprehensible. Hunger is a basic need, and while it is horrific that humans be
made the object rather than the subject of this desire, it is still understandable. When a creature
kills compulsively with no need to sustain itself, the viewer is faced with senseless and needless
violence. Thus Petronius’ werewolf is extra fierce because “omnia pecora momordit, tanquam
lanius sanguinem illis misit” 247 [he bit the entire herd, just as a butcher lets out blood from
them]. He killed far more than he could eat. And while a human butcher exsanguinates animals
in preparation for other humans to eat them, Petronius’ werewolf seems to kill for the pure
pleasure of letting out the blood. In Daninsky’s case his bloodlust seems to reflect the turmoil of
the Spanish Civil War, which Naschy describes in terms of a nation cannibalizing itself:
“Spaniard killed Spaniard in a war of bloody fratricide.” 248 Although Naschy was exposed to
intense carnage during the civil war at an early age and confessed that “those chilling images will
be with me until the end of my days,” 249 he nevertheless seems to revel in the bloodshed of his
werewolf and acknowledges the heady appeal of bloodlust. Bryan Senn notes how apparent this
is in Naschy’s first film, La marca del hombre lobo (1968):
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It’s a brutal, pitiless, and gruesome introduction to the monster Waldemar has become . . .
it became the first to drag the werewolf’s nature from the darkness of suggestion into the
blood-spattered light of undisguised savagery.” 250
Violence, usually considered a masculine characteristic, is here masculinity run amok. 251 The
same positive qualities valorized in Franco’s patriarchal state boil over the lip of their container
and threaten the cohesion of society. In Jungian terms, the werewolf is the Shadow of the fascist
regime, the chaotic violence that undergirds its call to order, prosperity, and safety. No matter
how hard officials work to repress the violence, to kill the werewolf, it always comes back again.
The werewolf cannot be denied and continues with its carnage unabated.
One way to cope with this uncomfortable reality is to project the undesired traits onto
people outside the privileged group. Therefore, one common aspect of the werewolf type is to
view the werewolf as the Other. He is outside of society, unable to fully integrate himself among
normative people. As Jacques Derrida notes, the French word loup-garou can be translated both
as “werewolf,” and “outlaw.” 252 The wolf, being an animal, is properly a creature of the
wilderness which exists outside the purview of human civilization and control, being
fundamentally Other to it; the werewolf is a liminal figure which transgresses this boundary
between the wild and the civilized. To confront the werewolf is to confront the human’s own
abject, his animality, in a shockingly familiar humanoid form.
Even when encased in fiction, the fascist censors viewed the werewolf as a threat to
Spanish identity and required Naschy to further otherize it. His original screenplay set the story
in Spain with Spanish characters, but the censors deemed the material of the film to be
250
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unbecoming of good Catholic citizens. Naschy was forced to alter the setting to another
European country and change the name of the werewolf character to be more foreign. He
complied with the censors’ requirements and channeled his own alienation into his werewolf
character, focusing on “the ostracism of someone who is despised for being different” 253:
Daninsky is a Polish name I gave to my werewolf, thinking of the oppressed people of
Poland. My character is bitter, persecuted and misunderstood, the bearer of a curse he
cannot shake off . . . Like Waldemar, I too have been left aside and misunderstood. I have
spent all my life swimming against the current. 254
Although the violence portrayed in the films bears a spiritual link to Spain’s own violence during
the civil war, Daninsky’s Polish identity allowed Spain to suppress their own faults and
memories and to instead project their violence onto foreign bodies. Non-Spanish people become
monstrous and serve to distance the violence to where it can be viewed as entertaining rather
than painfully proximate.
In keeping with this theme, Daninsky often begins as an outsider in the onset of each
film. In La marca del hombre lobo, he is a new arrival to the local community and lives in the
dilapidated castle of his ancestors. In La noche de walpulgris, he is killed by Austrian villagers
when they discover that he is a werewolf, and after being resurrected he must flee to another
remote village in France. Even here his home is a long distance from any other human habitation.
Daninsky’s separation from other humans, both physical and social, conforms to the othered
aspect of the werewolf type. Other authors have used the werewolf in similar ways to describe
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the plight of marginalized groups such as the poor, racial minorities, women, and
homosexuals.255
While the Other can be viewed as monstrous, the same supernatural abilities can also
make him a hero. This is in keeping with the werewolf tradition in medieval romances, where the
werewolves are often knights or kings who retain their noble nature in wolf form, helpful
towards their liege and dangerous for their foes. Marie de France’s “Bisclavret” (circ. 1160–78)
and the anonymous Guillaume de Palerne (circ. 1194–97) are examples of such. Their curse is
being misunderstood or isolated from society (the Othered motif) rather than succumbing to
uncontrollable bloodlust. These werewolves choose to use their supernatural abilities to protect
rather than harm humanity.
This vein of sympathetic, protagonist werewolves continues to the present day. Some of
the more recent iterations include Carrie Vaughn’s Kitty Saves the World (2015), where
werewolf radio-show host Kitty Norvile saves the entire world from the Devil, or Patricia
Briggs’ Fire Touched (2016), where a local werewolf pack decides to protect Tri-Cities,
Washington from supernatural threats. The television series Teen Wolf (2011–17) makes the
distinction even clearer when the heroic pack leader Scott McCall emphatically proclaims
“You’re not a monster; you’re a werewolf, like me.” 256 The identity of heroic werewolf is set in
opposition to that of bloodthirsty monster. All of these narratives emphasize the way that human
control can keep violent desires in check and channel them for the greater good.
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Although Daninsky always falls short of this control, he nevertheless seeks to sacrifice
his own life to end the carnage he afflicts on the nearby villagers. In Naschy’s eyes, this makes
the werewolf figure heroic. After watching The Wolf Man as a child, he remarked: “Larry Talbot
was my hero: After all, he was a good man whose only desire was to find a cure to free him from
his need to kill.” 257 Actor Jack Taylor, who worked with Naschy on a werewolf and Dr. Jekyll
crossover film, likewise noted how Naschy’s werewolf is “a victim of destiny, a sensitive
creature who suffers.” 258 Naschy invites the audience to view the werewolf’s condition as tragic,
to pity his lack of control and to fear that the same unbinding of their own id could result in
similar othering and death.
Senn notes how Naschy plays up the positive, masculine, heroic, and romantic aspects of
the werewolf type to the point where “he goes that extra mile to turn the sympathetic Waldemar
into a veritable action hero” 259:
Naschy (who not only starred but scripted) takes great pains to make his tortured
Wolfman the hero—a courageous character to be admired who inspires sympathy as
much as terror . . . Still, while casting the werewolf in a heroic light, the sequence
gruesomely illustrates his savage nature. 260
What makes Naschy’s use of the type different is that Daninsky combines the violence and
alienation of the horror monster with the sympathetic hero trope. The audience is meant to look
past the othering qualities of the werewolf and identify with the dashing and ultimately good
man. Usually heroic werewolves eschew hunting innocents or killing humans altogether. While
Daninsky kills film extras indiscriminately, he remembers not to attack his love interest even
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when in the throes of his transformation. He often fights off other monsters, such as vampires
and Yetis, who threaten his woman. This ethos of protecting one’s own while savaging others
echoes the mentality of civil war; although the most intimate of relations may remain intact,
larger societal attachments are lost. To be a hero in this setting does not preclude violence
towards one’s neighbor.
The search for a cure to the curse, of a way of restoring the superego and the safety of
civilization, often becomes an all-consuming task for the werewolf. Even though he only
becomes a wolf-man once a month on the nights of a full moon, the curse commands all of his
attention for the rest of the month, as normal life cannot resume so long as the werewolf is a
danger to others. This allows for Daninsky to be a sympathetic character because he is willing to
sacrifice his own life to end the violence he inflicts involuntarily on others.
Most often the cure comes in the form of a permanent death, which is no easy feat for the
nearly immortal werewolf. Although in one iteration of Daninsky’s story he manages to find a
flower to cure himself, in the others his one goal is to release his soul from the curse in lasting
death. Like other werewolves, silver is an effective way to kill Daninsky. But Naschy adds a
twist—the silver must be wielded by someone who truly loves him. This means that even the
romantic plot lines are subordinated to his desire to end the curse. As Naschy explains in an
interview: “Aware that his romantic affairs have no future, he seeks them out only to get rid of
his curse.” 261 The women in each film are means to an end; Daninsky has no qualms
manipulating them into loving and then killing him even when it places them in emotional and
physical danger. He inevitably charms a young nubile woman (sometimes more than one) and
leads them to bedroom scenes that miraculously slipped past the censors of the time. Women
find him irresistible, leaving their normal lovers to pursue him. It is a male fantasy enacted on
261
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the screen, where social conventions of sexual morality can be justifiably flaunted in the service
of the greater good of killing the werewolf. In this way he differs from other werewolves who
pursue the cure through more noble means. In the Victorian Wagner the Wehr-Wolf (1846–47),
for example, the titular character is released from his curse only after he resists temptation from a
seductive woman.
Again Naschy focuses on how the ends justify the means. The werewolf curse is a
problem for society, and for all that Daninsky is a good and moral man (by Naschy’s standards,
at least), he must die for the good of the community. Violence towards others and violence
against the self are acceptable sacrifices to restore societal order, a central tenet of fascism.
Although the films reveal the violence and death inherent in such political systems, Naschy
projects it safely onto his own body made monstrous and foreign. For all the pleasure his
gruesome antics produce for the audience, the werewolf must die at the end of the film. But for
all that his death is necessary, it is likewise crucial that he and his violence be revived for the
next film. And around and around he goes. Fascists cannot abide chaos and yet cannot survive
without it, since the constant need for its suppression justifies their existence. Daninsky is a
boogyman to be crushed and simultaneously a dark reflection of humanity’s own violent
tendencies.
Naschy’s fascination with the werewolf type is an expression of both his own attraction
to and his repulsion towards violence. By drawing on the type he is able to create werewolf texts
that communicate these feelings, as well as portray the universal struggle to sublimate them for
the sake of civilization. As he reflected towards the end of his career:
Waldemar Daninsky represents more than just a charismatic character of the silver
screen. As well as being a fierce, persecuted, erotic, ambiguous hero/antihero who is
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forever seeking deliverance in death, Daninsky is a kind of Don Quijote of the
netherworld and only those love him can comprehend him. Really he has little in
common with Lawrence Talbot or León Carido. Waldemar is the Sir Percival of
Darkness, the result of a unique set of circumstances, at once real and unreal. 262
By analyzing Daninsky through the lens of Naschy’s typology and my own, I hope to have
shown the complex transformations of the type as Naschy concretizes it in his films. Perhaps in
comprehending this, it is easier to appreciate a work that once dazzled Spanish audiences with
spectacular gore as they sought to escape the all-too-recent memories of their own violent past.
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Conclusion
The field of classical usages is vast—far too vast for one or even five methodologies to
dissect and classify neatly. What I have attempted here is only a cursory summary of some of the
more prevalent approaches in a growing discipline. These methods still need to be refined and
expanded; new methodologies need to be adapted from other disciplines; and novel theories of
usages could be developed tailor-made for Classics. With more finely adapted methodologies
and a greater variety of theoretical approaches, scholars should be able to yield quality analysis
and expand the scope of texts which they are able to examine.
What I hope to have clarified in these pages are the underlying assumptions and the
resulting theoretical frameworks which already govern the study of post-classical usages of
classical mythology. This should aid scholars in asking new questions of texts and draft clearer
answers. A common problem in studying these usages is to entangle different methods and overextend one’s claims beyond what one can prove (such as claiming a type is an adaptation).
Understanding the multiplicity of ways that classical myths make their way into novel works will
hopefully allow scholars to focus on the aspects of classical usages that best fit the text in
question. These methods could also be effectively blended, particularly when the author is
openly employing one myth and simultaneously weaving in others, be it secretly or
subconsciously.
Regardless of the method one uses, studying a classical usage usually returns to the same
two questions: How does understanding the myth help the reader better understand the new
work’s meaning, and how does the meaning of the myth change in the context of the new work?
What astounds is that despite the simplicity and limited scope of these questions, they
nevertheless yield innumerable interpretations as they are applied to different texts. It is the
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versatility of the classical myths, their ability to explain and be explained in such varied ways,
which has assured their longevity and power.
This continued value and manipulation of mythology challenges the common idea that
the civilizations of ancient Greece and Rome are dead and buried. Even after 476 C. E., Greeks
and Romans lived on, speaking their language and recounting their myths. Just as their speech
evolved into the Modern Greek and the Romance languages, their myths adapted with the times,
every bit as alive and thriving as when they first leapt from Homer’s lips. Classics as a discipline
has traditionally focused on the past, on the molted skins of creatures who have long since grown
and moved on. Only in the last few decades have classicists turned greater attention to the
evolutionary process and the living iterations of Greco-Roman culture. Lately they have begun to
examine the inundation of classical usages in popular culture, following the myths as they move
from the purview of the elite and back into the possession of the folk. Myths have moved into all
corners of the globe, stowing away with Western imperialists and rebelling with postcolonial
reformers. They have settled in and hybridized, sometimes beyond recognition into unimagined
entities, and continue to multiply with leporine intensity. With the accelerating pace of media
production, there will be far more classical usages than classicists to analyze them.
As the field grows, so too grows the need for articulations of theories employed in the
discipline. I hope that this work, a gathering and ordering of such theories, will be of use in
furthering reception scholarship.
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